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TAXATION 
I. STARKER II: NONRECOGNITION OF LIKE-KIND 
EXCHANGES IS STRETCHED TO NEW LIMITS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Starker v. United States (Starker II),· the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals addressed a myriad of significant issues relat-
ing to nonrecognition treatment under section 1031 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code (the Code).2 Of primary importance to the tax 
practitioner, the court approved delayed three-corner exchanges.3 
The court also held that a contract right to land is a like-kind 
exchange for real property regardless of the possibility that cash 
might be received by the taxpaper.4 
B. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On April 1, 1967, along with his son and daughter-in-law, 
Bruce and Elizabeth Starker, T. J. Starker entered into a land 
exchange agreement with Crown Zellerbach (Crown). Pursuant 
to the agreement, the Starkers agreed to convey to Crown all 
their interests in 1,843 acres of timberland in Columbia County, 
Oregon. In consideration for this timberland, Crown agreed to 
buy and transfer to the Starkers other real property in Oregon 
and Washington. According to the agreement, Crown was to pro-
vide the Starkers with acceptable real property within five years 
or pay the outstanding balance in cash. Crown further agreed to 
credit a six percent annual "growth factor" to the Starkers' ex-
change balance. This "growth factor" was based on the exchange 
balance remaining on Crown's books at the end of each year. 
1. 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. Aug., 1979)(per Goodwin, J.; the other panel members 
were Anderson, J. and Jameson, D.J.). 
2. I.R.C. §§ 1031(a) (1954) provides as follows: 
(a) NONRECOGNITION OF GAIN OR LOSS FROM EX· 
CHANGES SOLELY IN KIND-No gain or loss shaH be rec-
ognized if property held for productive use in trade or business 
or for investment (not including stock in trade or other prop-
erty held primarily for sale, nor stocks, bonds, notes, choses in 
action, certificates of trust or beneficial interest, or other se-
curities or evidences of indebtedness or interest) is exchanged 
solely for property of a like kind to be held either for produc-
tive use in trade or business or for investment. 
3. 602 F.2d at 1353, 1354. 
4. [d. at 1355. 
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The Starkers deeded their timberland to Crown on May 31, 
1967, at which time Crown entered an "exchange value" credit 
in its books of $1,502,500 for T. J. Starker and $73,500 for Bruce 
and Elizabeth Starker. Within four months, Elizabeth and Bruce 
Starker found three suitable parcels of land which were promptly 
acquired and conveyed to them by Crown. Since the value of the 
transferred property equalled the Starkers' exchange balance of 
$73,500, no cash was paid to them. Likewise, no "growth factor" 
was added because a year had not expired since the timberland 
was deeded to Crown. 
Between July, 1967, and May, 1969, T. J. Starker selected 
twelve parcels of land. Crown purchased nine of these parcels 
from third parties and then transferred them to taxpayer. After 
Crown obtained them, two of the remaining parcels, the Timian 
and Bi-Mart properties, were conveyed at taxpayers' directions 
to his daughter, Jean Roth. The twelfth parcel, the Booth prop-
erty, involved a third party's contract to purchase. Crown pur-
chased that contract right and reassigned it to T. J. Starker. 
In their income tax returns for 1967, all three Starkers 
treated the transfers to Crown as nonrecognition transactions 
under section 1031 of the Code. The Internal Revenue Service 
ruled that the transactions were not tax exempt and assessed 
$300,930.31 plus interest against T. J. Starker and $35,248.41 
against Elizabeth and Bruce Starker. Taxpayers paid the defi-
ciencies and filed claims for refunds. When the refunds were de-
nied, they filed two actions for refunds in the district court. 
In the first action, Starker u. United'States5 (Starker I), the 
court granted Bruce and Elizabeth Starker their refund, thereby 
entitling the transaction to nonrecognition treatment. The Gov-
ernment chose not to pursue their appeal, and the appeal was 
voluntarily dismissed. The judgment became final. 
In Starker u. United States8 (Starker II), however, the Gov-
ernment vigorously argued that taxpayer was not entitled to 
nonrecognition treatment under section 1031. Despite the fact 
that this case was heard before the same district judge as in 
Starker I, the court implicitly held that its prior decision in favor 
5. 751 U.S.T.e. 87,142 (D. Or. 1975)(per Solomon, J.). 
6. 432 F. Supp. 864 (D. Or. 1977)(per Solomon, J.). 
2
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of the taxpayer in Starker I did not collaterally estop the govern-
ment from relitigating the applicability of section 1031.7 The 
court found that taxpayer had exchanged his property for a 
promise to convey like-kind property in the future, and there-
fore, the transfer to Crown did not qualify for nonrecognition 
treatment under section 1031.8 It further found the six percent 
"growth factor" added to taxpayer's exchange value credit was 
taxable as ordinary income.s 
In reaching its decision, the district court reconsidered the 
statutory purpose of section 1031 and its application and inter-
pretation of Alderson u. Commissioner.1O As to the purpose of 
section 1031, the court concluded that section 1031 was enacted 
to defer recognition on an exchange of property" which does not 
change the nature of the investment. 12 Stating that section 1031 
is to be strictly construed,13 the court found that taxpayer "must 
bring himself squarely within the explicit provisions of the ex-
ception to qualify for nonrecognition treatment. "14 
As to the application of Alderson u. Commissioner,15 the dis-
trict court stated that it had misread Alderson, and therefore re-
versed itself on the application of Alderson. 18 The court felt that 
its previous interpretation would be contrary to the purpose of 
section 1031 and would encourage tax avoidance. In Alderson, 
7. Id. at 868. See note 19 supra and accomplinying text. 
S.ld. 
9. Id. at 869. 
10. 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963). 
11. See Woodbury v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. ISO (1967). 
12. See Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 479 (1st Cir. 1940). 
13. 432 F. Supp. at 867. It is lin exception to the general rule that the entire gain or 
loss realized on disposition of property is recognized. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-l(b) 
(1962). 
14. 432 F. Supp. at S67, citing Coleman v. Commissioner, ISO F.2d 75S, 760 (Sth Cir. 
1950). 
15. 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963). 
16. In Starker I, the court believed that the reasoning in Alderson required the find-
ing that taxpayers were entitled to nonrecognition treatment under section 1031. In the 
instant case, the court realized that Alderson was not directly on point. In the opinion of 
Judge Solomon, who wrote the opinion in Starker I: 
I have considered my opinion in Starker I. I now conclude that 
I was mistaken in my holding as well as in my earlier reading 
of Alderson. Even if Alderson can be interpreted as contended 
by plaintiff, I think that to do so would be improper. It would 
merely sanction a tax avoidance scheme and not carry out the 
purposes of § 1031. 
432 F Supp. 867-68. 
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taxpayer agreed to sell his property. Before the sale was consum-
mated, taxpayer located a second parcel which he wanted to ex-
change for his property. The escrow agreement was amended, 
and ultimately, the parties exchanged deeds. A reciprocal, si-
multaneous exchange of like-kind property was the result,17 enti-
tling taxpayer to nonrecognition treatment under section 1031. 
The district court also attacked T. J. Starker's motives in 
Starker II by noting that the "exchange" in question, i.e., the 
transfer of all taxpayers' rights in the timberland in return for a 
promise to transfer future like-kind property, was an attempt to 
unduly expand the definition of "exchange."18 In so doing, tax-
payer sought to disguise a sale as an exchange thereby ignoring 
the relevant statutory distinctions. 
In departing from its application of Alderson followed in 
Starker I, the district court implicitly decided that the Govern-
ment was not collaterally estopped from litigating Starker II.19 
Additionally, the court noted that the six percent growth factor 
on the exchange balance which was to be paid to Starker at the 
time of the last off-setting charge. Believing that the growth fac-
tor was really used to conceal the true nature of the transac-
tion,20 the court found that "it was really interest and should be 
taxed as ordinary income."21 The district court, in finding for the 
17. Unlike Anderson, T. J. Starker did not enter into either a reciprocal nor a simul-
taneous exchange. Although the court noted that there may be cases where there must be 
a simutaneous exchange to qualify for non-recognition treatment under § 1031, this was 
not one of them. Id. at 868 n.3. 
18. [d. at 868. 
19. Id. at 867. While it recognized that many of the transfers of the instant case were 
identical to those in Starker I, the court noted issues which were not raised in the former 
case. Unlike Starker I, Crown transferred property to a third person, taxpayer's daughter. 
Id. The court also made a distinction between the arguments set forth by the Govern-
ment in Starker I, with those made in Starker 11. For example, in Starker I, the Govern-
ment claimed that there was no exchange because there was no simultaneous transfer of 
property between Crown and the Starkers. In Starker 11, the Government also argued 
that there was no like-kind exchange, on the ground that taxpayer transferred his prop-
erty for a promise which was the equivalent of cash. Id. 
20. Id. at 869. 
21. [d. Taxpayer claimed that even if the "growth factor" was found to be interest, 
it was taxable in 1969 because that was the year Crown reported it as interest and, be-
cause the 6% was added to taxpayer's exchange balance at the last offsetting charge in 
1969. The court concluded, however, that the parties themselves treated these payments 
as having been received in 1967. Crown calculated the "growth factor" daily and kept a 
running total in its books under the heading of "interest." Upon acquiring property for 
taxpayer, Crown first subtracted the price of the parcel from the accrued interest. Thus, 
4
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Government, dismissed T. J. Starker's action. 22 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the Government is 
collaterally estopped from relitigating the applicability of section 
1031 to nine of the twelve properties in Starker II.23 With respect 
to the remaining Bi-Mart, Timian and Booth properties, collat-
. eral estoppel did not apply. For these properties the court ex-
amined whether T. J. Starker qualified for nonrecognition treat-
ment under section 1031.24 The court found that taxpayer never 
received an interest in the Timian and Bi-Mart properties,25 be-
the principle balance was reduced only to the extent that the interest did not cover the 
cost of the parcel. Such an arrangement allowed taxpayer to obtain additional interest. 
22.Id. 
23. 602 F .2d at 1350. The Ninth Circuit outlined its analysis for a collateral estoppel 
claim. In order for collateral estoppel to apply, the court must find that the two cases, 
Starker I & II, present similar legal question, facts and parties. 
1. Legal Question Presented. For collateral estoppel to apply, the issue in the sec· 
ond litigation must have been litigated and decided in the first case. Id. at 1344. The first 
problem the court faced was that of defining the legal issue for purposes of applying 
collateral estoppel. Stated broadly, the legal issue decided in Starker I was whether non· 
recognition treatment under section 1031 applied to the transfers pursuant to the 
Starker· Crown contract. Except for a change in verbal formula, the argument advanced 
by the Government was substantially the same as that in Starker I. The Government 
made the same appeals to the legislative history and purpose of section 1031, and there· 
fore, the Ninth Circuit was unconvinced that the legal issues presented by the Govern-
ment were different. 
2. Facts. With the exception of Bi-Mart, Timian and Booth, in nine of the twelve 
parcels of property received by T. J. Starker, the Ninth Circuit found no consequentional 
differences in facts from Starker I, citing Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979), 
and Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948). 602 F.2d at 1345-48. The recent Su-
preme Court holding in Montana controlled the Ninth Circuit's finding which applies 
collateral estoppel in a second case even though some facts differ provided that the differ-
ing facts were not "essential to the judgment" or "of controlling significance" in the first 
case. 440 U.S. at 158. Although no longer followed on the issue of similarity of facts, the 
Ninth Circuit discussed Sunnen at length and noted that it may have led the court to 
reach the same results as it did under Montana. 602 F.2d at 1345-47. 
3. Parties. Even though T. J. Starker was not a party in Starker I, nor was that suit 
in any way financed or controlled by him, (see, Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 
(1979)), and therefore could not have been bound by an unfavorable judgment in Starker 
I, T. J. Starker sought to assert an advantageous holding of that case in order to estop 
the government's defense. The Ninth Circuit relied on Park lane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 
U.S. 322 (1979), where the Supreme Court presented a new analysis for cases involving 
the offensive use of collateral estoppel. Although the Ninth Circuit remarked that the 
district court "did not have the benefit of Parklane Hosiery u. Shore when it decided 
[Starker 11)" the court nevertheless applied the principles set forth in Parkland Hosiery 
and held that the government is estopped from pursuing its claims against T. J. Starker 
because of the final resolution in Starker I. 602 F.2d at 1349. 
24. Id. at 1350. 
25. The Timian property is a residence. The Bi-Mart property is a commercial 
bUilding. T. J. Starker claims to have expended substantial time and money in mainte-
nance'and improvements in the three months before it was transferred to his daughter. 
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cause he was never given title to them. Title to both parcels was 
transferred from Crown directly to taxpayer's daughter.26 Conse-
quently, Timian27 and Bi-Mart could not be considered proper-
ties received by taxpayer in exchange for his timberland.28 
As to the remaining Booth property, despite the contingen-
cies attached to the property,28 including the possibility that T. 
J. Starker might receive cash,30 the court found that taxpayer 
received the equivalent of a fee interest for purposes of section 
1031.31 Both issues of whether taxpayer had, in fact, received 
like-kind property and whether the exchange had to be simulta-
neous were also resolved in T. J. Starker's favor. 32 The court 
further held that the six percent growth factor taxpayer received 
was in fact disguised interest on Crown's unpaid credit balance.33 
He also emphasizes that he controlled and ordered the property to be conveyed to her. 
26. In 1968, taxpayer paid a gift tax on these two properties, but whether he actually 
owed this tax was not a issue. [d. at 1350 n.7. 
27. Specifically as to the Timian property, the Ninth Circuit held that nonrecogni-
tion could not be given to residential property. [d. at 1350. The court declared that "it 
has long been the rule that use of property solely as a personal residence is antithetical to 
its being held for investment," since losses on the sale or exchange of such property are 
not deductible. [d., citing Treas. Reg. § 1.165-9{a) (1954). 
28. Under an analogous nonrecognition provision, § 1034 provides that maintaining 
continuity of title is paramount to receiving nonrecognition treatment. If title shifts from 
one taxpayer to another, with the exception of one's spouse, nonrecognition is denied. 
Marcello v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1967). In some cases an identity of 
economic interests may be viewed between father and daughter. McWilliams v. Com-
missioner, 331 U.S. 694 (1974). However, the Ninth Circuit held that unity is insufficient 
to consider transfer of title to one the same as transfer of title to the other. 602 F.2d 1351. 
29. Legal title for the Booth property had not passed by deed to the taxpayer. 
Rather, Starker held a third-party purchasers' right under a sales agreement which pro-
vided for a life interest to the original transferor. Until the life interest ends, legal title 
cannot pass. However, until then, purchasers are entitled to possession subject to restric-
tions. If any of the conditions are violated, the seller may elect, inter alia, to void the 
·contract. [d. 
30. See text accompanying notes 38 to 40 supra. 
31. For purposes of determining whether the properties exchanged are of like-kind, a 
leasehold interest of 30 years or more is the equivalent of a fee interest. Century Elec. Co. 
v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 155, 160 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 954 (1952). Treas. 
Reg. § 1.1031 (a)-l{c) (1954). See Rev. Rul. 72-601, 1972-2 C.B. 467 (A father and his son 
were both farm owners. The father owned in fee simple a 1oo-acre farm. The son owned 
in fee simple a 142-acre farm. Father and son conveyed their properties to each other. 
Son reserved a remainder interest in the property he transferred to his father. Likewise, 
the father reserved a life estate in the property he conveyed the remainder interest to his 
son. Neither conveyences by the father nor the son were found to qualify for nonrecogni-
tion under § 1031 of the Code). 
32. See notes 39 to 49 supra and accompanying text. 
33. Despite Starker's contention that the 6% merely compensated him for timber 
growth, the court pointed out that T.J. Starker was entitled to the payments regardless 
of the actual fate of the timber. 602 F.2d at 1356. 
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Finally, the court held that income arising out of taxpayer's 
rights in his contract with Crown was treated as being received 
at the time contract was made.3• 
While the Ninth Circuit decided numerous issues in Starker 
u. United States, this Note will focus on the most critical issues 
presented by the court: whether section 1031 requires simultane-
ity of deed transfers, and whether the exchanges were of quali-
fied like-kind property. These issues arose primarily in the 
court's discussion involving the transfer of the Booth property 
and, therefore, will be discussed solely in that context .. 
C. THE COURT'S REASONING BEHIND THE BOOTH PROPERTY 
Two features of the Booth transaction were pinpointed by 
the court to trigger the recognition of gain. First, there was the 
likelihood that taxpayer would receive cash instead of real prop-
erty. Second, a time gap existed in the transfers of exchange 
property. 
The court began its analysis by adopting a broad and liberal 
interpretation of section 1031. It rejected the Government's argu-
ment that nonrecognition under section 1031 is to be narrowly 
construed under Treasury Regulation 1.1002-1(b).35 The court 
pointed out that this interpretation of the regulation is to be 
34. Since the Timian and Bi·Mart properties were deemed "boot," i.e., not like·kind 
property under § 1031, Starker recognized gain to the extent of the fair market values of 
these properties on the dates which their title passed to taxpayer's daughter. However, as 
to the disguised interest, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, and held that T. J. 
Starker is liable for ordinary income in 1967. Id .. 
This holding, which looks to the year taxpayer made the transaction rather than the 
year he actually received the income, has created a possible loophole. The Internal Reve· 
nue Service is usually blocked by the statute of limitations from collecting tax if the time 
lapse is over three years, as was the case in Starker. I.R.C. § 6501.(1954). The court 
acknowledged that some administrative difficulties might arise, l;lUt referred responsibil-
ity to Congress. 
35. [d. at 1352, 1353. Nonrecognition under § 1301 is a noted exception to the gen-
eral rule requiring recognition of all gains and losses. Treas. Reg. 1·1002·1 (c) (1954). 
Under subsection (b), the Government argued: 
The exceptions from the general rule. . . are strictly construed 
and do not extend either beyond the words or the underlying 
assumptions and purposes of the exception. Nonrecognition is 
accorded by the Code only if the exchange if one which satis· 
fies both (1) the specific description in the Code of an excepted 
exchange, and (2) the underlying purpose for which such ex· 
change is excepted from the general rule. 
602 F.2d at 1352. 
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seriously questioned in light of the lack of a clear underlying 
purpose36 to section 1031 and a long line of cases liberally con-
struing this sectionY 
Having adopted its liberal stance, the court first addressed 
the issue of whether the possibility that Starker might receive 
cash rendered section 1031 inapplicable. The court examined a 
series of cases involving the possibility of a cash transaction38 
and found that the mere possibility at the time of the agreement 
that a cash sale might occur does not prevent the application of 
section 1031.39 The Government argued that the cases were dis-
tinguishable in that the possibility of a receipt of cash may have 
existed at the time of the exchange agreement, but did not exist 
at the time the taxpayer transferred the property. 40 This differ-
ence in timing, the Government argued, distinguished Starker II 
from the cases cited by the court. 
Next, the Ninth Circuit, relying on the broad interpretation 
of section 1031 in the earlier cited cases, gave only cursory treat-
ment to the requirement of a simultaneous transfer. Redwing 
Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson 41 was cited as being "at least one ap-
36. The court pointed out the problem with applying a strict construction of § 1031 
when the underlying purpose of the section is unclear and "elusive." Two major consider-
ations loomed behind the drafters enactment of § 1031, but the Starker II court found 
that neither of them can be viewed as controlling. 
According to the liquidity rationale, "the provision was designed to avoid the imposi-
tion of tax on persons who do not cash in on their investments in trade or business prop-
erty." [d. at 1352. The valuation rationale grew from the supposed consideration of the 
drafters of the difficulty of valuing property exchanged for the sole purpose of determin-
ing gain or loss. Id. 
37. Id. at 1353 & n.10. 
38. See, e.g., Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1967)(Even though 
taxpayer received cash, the court indicated its agreement with the cash option approach 
when taxpayer retains right to receive like-kind property.); Coastal Terminals, Inc. v. 
United States, 320 F.2d 333 (4th Cir. 1963)(In this "three-comer exchange," taxpayer 
and the other party maintained the option to bring about a cash sale until closing.); 
Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963)(Taxpayer entered into a cash sale 
agreement, but later changed to a like-kind exchange with sale option); Mercantile Trust 
Co. v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 82 (1935). (Taxpayer qualified for nonrecognition treat-
ment because of intention to get other property, if possible, rather than cash.). Cf. Smith 
v. Commissioner, 537 F.2d 972 (8th Cir. 1976)(transfer of cash to and from taxpayer's 
hands defeated the application of § 1031). 
39. 602 F.2d at 1354. 
40. [d. 
41. 399 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1968). In Redwing Carriers, taxpayer attempted to deduct 
a loss in the purchase of new trucks to replace his used trucks. To prevent nonrecognition 
exchange under § 1031, the parent corporation transferred the old trucks to a subsidiary 
who sold them to the manufacturer for cash, and the corporation then bought new trucks 
8
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pellate decision" which indicates that exchanges may not have 
to be simultaneous for section 1031 treatment,42 In that case, the 
Fifth Circuit court permitted some lack of simultaneit.y. Despite 
the Government's contentions, the court, without elaboration, 
declined to draw a line distinguishing the time gap in the title 
exchanges of the previous cases from the more "substantial" pe-
riod of time in Starker. 43 
Finally, the court addressed both of the Government's con-
tentions that taxpayer's contract right to receive land was not 
"like" title to property. The Government insisted that the con-
tract right to land was like cash, and asked the court to impose a 
"cash equivalency" test44 to determine the applicability of sec-
tion 1031. Declining to apply such a test, the Ninth Circuit 
stated, "that title to land is no more or less equivalent to cash 
than a contract right to buy land."45 The force of the court's 
position rested in a re-emphasis on the purpose of section 1031: 
to avoid the inequity of taxpayer being forced to recognize a 
"gain which was still tied up in a continuing investment of the 
same sort. "48 
The Government also raised the argument that a contract 
right to land is a "chose in action."47 Being personal property 
rather than real property, a "chose in action" would, therefore, 
not qualify as a like-kind exchange under section 1031.48 The 
Ninth Circuit responded, stating: 
[TJitle to real property, like a contract right to 
purchase real property, is nothing more than a 
bundle of potential causes of action: for trespass, 
for cash. The court disallowed the loss deduction holding that a tax-free exchange could 
not be transformed into two sales by the arbitrary separation of time and cash. Id. at 659. 
42. 602 F.2d at 1355. 
43.Id. 
44. Id. see generally Scholossberg, Cash Equivalent and Constructive Receipt-How 
These Doctrines Bring Immediate Taxation, 22 J. TAX. 18 (1965). 
45.Id. 
46. Id., quoting Jordan Marsh Co. v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 453, 456 (2nd Cir. 
1959). . 
47. For a general definition, see 63 AM. JUR. 2d Property 26,27 (1972). Compare Ore-
gon Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 192 (1953) with Starker v. United States, 602 
F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979) In Oregon Lumber, land was exchanged for standing timber. 
The court held that an exchange of realty for personalty is not an exchange of like-kind 
property. Since this was a right to cut and remove property, similar to utilization of 
property, it can be distingu·ished from Starker. Starker actually received the right to the 
land itself, not personal property on the land. 
48. For the relevant statutory language of § 1031, see note 2 supra. 
9
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to quiet title, for interference with quiet enjoy-
ment and so on. The bundle of rights associated 
with ownership is obviously not included from 
section 1031; a contract right to assume the rights 
of ownership should not be believe, be treated 
as any different than the ownership rights them-
selves.~g 
The court returned to a consideration of the statutory pur-
pose of section 1031 and concluded that if taxpayer ultimately 
received property rather than cash, the exchange would qualify 
as like-kind.50 This holding is supported by Biggs u. Commis-
sioner,s, where the Tax Court found that as long as taxpayer 
solely obtains contractual rights to qualifying property, instead 
of contractual rights plus cash, . the transaction status is pre-
served as an exchange.52 
D. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S REASONING 
Simultaneity Not Required 
The Ninth Circuit, by holding that exchanges need not be 
simultaneous to qualify under section 1031, has created a possi-
ble loophole for taxpayers wishing to avoid the taxation of gain 
on an eventual cash transaction. The Starker II court flatly re-
fused to draw a line between "some lack"53 of simuluaneity and a 
"substantial"54 lack of simultaneity. This finding may well be er-
roneous in light of the weight of authority permitting only a 
slight delay in exchanges, and the potential result, allowing tax-
payers to completely avoid taxation.55 
The Government's argument, although not clearly articu-
lated, was that the difference in timing of the exchanges renders 
Redwing Carriers, Inc. u. Tomlinson58 and the Alderson line of 
49. 602 F.2d at 1355. 
5O.Id. 
51. 69 T.C. 905 (1978). 
52. Id. at 919. See generally Price, Exchanging Like-Kind Property Under Section 
1031, 56 TAXES 594 (1978). 
53. 602 F.2d at 1354-55. See Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 399 F.2d 652, 655 
(5th Cir. 1968). 
54. 602 F.2d at 1355. 
55. Commentators have suggested the need for Congressional intervention. See gen-
erally Harrock, Section 1031 Exchanges: Step Transaction Analysis and the Need for 
Legislatiue Amendment, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 351 (1976). 
56. 399 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1968). 
10
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 15
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss1/15
1980] TAXATION 503 
cases57 inapplicable. This argument has some merit. In Redwing 
Carriers, the court relied on the fact that mutual transfers oc-
cured "at or about" the same time.58 True, the transfers were not 
simultaneous, but they did occur within a matter of months, not 
years. T. H. Baird Publishing Co. u. Commissioner,59 while not 
mentioned by the court, holds that a nonsimultaneous exchange 
qualifies under section 1031. Yet Baird is distinguishable on two 
grounds. First, although taxpayer deeded his property prior to 
the exchange, he retained beneficial ownership during the in-
terim months. Thus, taxpayer conveyed beneficial ownership of 
property at the same time that he received like-kind property 
from the other party. 80 Baird has therefore been argued as repre-
senting a simultaneous exchange.8t Second, like Redwing Carri-
ers, the time delay in Baird was only a matter of months. 
By eliminating simultaneity and permitting open-ended 
transactions the Starker court has allowed taxpayers the option 
to determine whether they want to receive property, or simply 
cash.82 Taxpayer can, thereby, avoid being taxed on substantial 
gain by holding open beyond the statute of limitations those 
transactions which they do not intend to exchange for like-kind 
property. 83 
Contract Right Qualifies as Like-Kind 
The court's position that Starker's receipt of a contract right 
to land was not equivalent to cash, but actually qualified as a 
57. Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1967); Coastal Terminals, Inc. v. 
United States, 320 F.2d 333 (4th Cir. 1963); Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790 (9th 
Cir. 1963); Mercantile Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 82 (1935). 
58. 399 F.2d at 655. 
59. 39 T.C. 608 (1962). Baird involved a three-party exchange where taxpayer 
deeded the property while retaining use of the property, rent free, until the other party 
acquired property on which to construct a new building. This building was to be trans-
ferred to taxpayer who would then relinquish use of its formerly deeded property. In or-
der to obtain funds to purchase land on which to construct new building, the other party 
immediately deeded taxpayer's property to a third person. See also Coastal Terminals, 
Inc. v. United States, 3~0 F.2d 333 (4th Cir. 1963); Mercantile Trust Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 32 B.T.A. 82 (1935). 
60. In Starker II, perhaps taxpayer could have claimed that the 6% "growth factor" 
represented a beneficial ownership which was retained only to be conveyed 'at the same 
time that Crown transferred the exchange property. See Sloma, The Five- Year Like-Kind 
Exchange, 55 NEB. L. REv. 511, 517 (1976). 
61. Brief for Appellant at 15, Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979). 
62. See generally Huskins, Section 1031 Like-Kind Property Exchanges; Possibilities 
and Pitfalls, 30 So. CALIF. TAX lNST. 459, 489 (1978). 
63. See note 34 supra. 
11
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like-kind exchange has been attacked by the Government84 as 
well as commentators under a constructive receipt of cash argu-
ment.a5 The general constructive receipt rule states that if tax-
payers actually or constructively receive cash for their invest-
ment, liquidation has occurred and section 1031 does not apply.a8 
Under this principle, taxpayers, although not in actual physical 
control over cash, may be in such close relationship to its control 
that they will be considered in "constructive receipt" for tax 
purposes. For example, if income is credited to taxpayer's ac-
count, and all taxpayer must do is reach for it, then the income 
will be regarded as constructively received.87 The only require-
ment, however, is that there must be no substantial limitations 
or restrictions on obtaining its use, nor on its expenditure.a8 
A constructive receipt argument may apply to the facts in 
Starker II, which would therefore mean that section 1031 should 
not apply.ou T. J. Starker, although not having direct control 
over how the money was to be used, had rights70 under the agree-
ment providing sufficiently broad authority over the purchase of 
property as to be equivalent to control over cash.7I 
64. Brief for Appellee at 27, Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979). 
65. See generally Sloma, supra note 60, at 514. In this Note the writer discussed the 
implication of Starker I. The perspective indicates that the definition of "exchange" was 
extended far beyond the contemporaneous swapping of property for which the section 
had previously been used. 
66. Harrock, supra note 55, at 355. 
67. See J. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX § 82 (1973). For further discussion, see 
Horsley, Tax Liability Without Cash: How "Constructive Receipt" Traps Taxpayers, 31 
J. TAX. 116 (1969). 
68. J. CHOMMIE, supra note 67, at 224. For cases which stand for the proposition that 
where limitations upon the receipt of income are an integral part of the agreement be· 
tween parties and that taxpayer does not have an unqualified right to receive cash, the 
funds are deemed not constructively received, see McCouley V. United States, 193 F. 
Supp. 938 (E.D. Ark. 1961); Woodbury V. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 180 (1967); Amend v. 
Commissioner, 13 T.C. 178 (1949). 
69. The Government argued that the facts in Starker closely paralleled those in 
Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1967). In Carlton, however, the taxpayer 
in exchange for the desired property was assigned not only purchase contracts, but was 
also given cash for the total amount of their purchase price. 
Similarly, in Rogers V. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 126 (1965), taxpayer used the cash 
received on an option on his land to purchase the like-kind property. The court held that 
the receipt of cash caused the transaction to become a sale, rather than an exchange. ld. 
at 137. 
70. Taxpayer was able to specify: what type of property he desired; when he chose to 
receive it; and how much of the credit balance was to be expended to obtain the 
property. 
71. (19751 61-3rd TAX MNGM'T (BNA)§ A-14. 
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Ultimately, the constructive receipt argument is too weak 
to prevail in Starker II. Taxpayer neither received cash nor had 
the right under the contract to demand cash instead of property; 
that right was reserved for Crown. Starker had no more control 
over the cash used by Crown to purchase exchange property than 
any other taxpayer in multi-party transfer. 
E. THE RESULT: A MODIFIED SUBSTANCE OVER FORM 
Although the Ninth Circuit disavowed any reliance on the 
"substance over form" truism72 in Starker II through its hold-
ings the court has strongly reinforced the use of this argument 
when deciding section 1031 cases. Having long been limited to 
formally structuring transfers to fit within section 1031, taxpay-
ers have gained added flexibility by this court-approved em-
phasis on the substance of the transaction. When using the sub-
stance over form argument for the application of section 1031, 
a taxpayer must merely show that the ultimate transaction con-
stitutes an exchange of like-kind property rather than a sale. 
The Ninth Circuit's holding is consistent with cases allowing 
unlimited flexibility in achieving nonrecognition under section 
1031. Transactions have differed as to number of parties, to 
types of property exchanged, and to options and time of the 
transfers. 73 Furthermore, Congressional intent74 not to tax a con-
72. When the "substance over form" argument is advanced, taxpayers usually struc-
ture their transactions in a way that superficially will qualify under a Code section. The 
" Government will ignore taxpayer's strict adherence to the form requirement and focus on 
the substance and result of the transaction. Typically, the Government has used Com-
missioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945), and Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 
465 (1935) to support its argument. Both cases involved corporate taxpayers who tried to 
structure transactions which would best take advantage of the Code; both corporations 
lost their cases. The courts emphasized the substance versus form dichotomy: "[Plutting 
aside, then, the question of motive in respect to taxation altogether, and fixing the char-
acter of the proceeding by what actually occurred, what do we find?" [d. at 469. In Court 
Holding Co., the Court responded: 
The incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of a 
transaction. The tax consequences which arise from gains from 
a sale of property are not finally to be determined solely by the 
means employed to transfer legal title. Rather, the transaction 
must be viewed as a whole, and each step from commence-
ment of negotiations to the consummation of the sale, is 
relevant. . 
324 U.S. at 334. 
Now courts have used these cases to support taxpayers who structure like-kind prop-
erty exchanges under a tax avoidance motive. See generally Sloma, supra note 60; Hus-
kins, supra note 63, at 491-94. 
73. See, e.g., Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 399 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1968); 
Coastal Terminals, Inc. v. United States, 320 F.2d 333 (4th Cir. 1963); Alderson v. Com-
13
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tinued investment in like-kind property also enhances a "sub-
stance over form" approach. It does, therefore, appear consistent 
for the Ninth Circuit to relax the rigid timing formality to not 
require a simultaneous exchange; and to expand the types of 
qualifying property exchanges to include a contract right to land 
to be like-kind to title to real property. 
At least one major form element is still required for section 
1031 treatment. Taxpayers are cautioned to avoid the receipt of 
or control over cash.75 This constraint is clearly illustrated by the 
harsh result in Carlton v. United States,76 where the Fifth Cir-
cuit taxed the transaction as a sale because cash passed through 
taxpayer hands. While courts are increasingly more tolerant for 
added flexibility in section 1031 transactions, a major form re-
quirement remains. The effect has been the courts' adoption of 
missioner, 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963); Biggs v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 905 (1978); Baird 
Co. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 608 (1962); Mercantile Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 32 
B.T.A. 82 (1935). 
74. The Report accompanying the 1934 Revenue Act provided some insight into the 
legislative intent of § 1031: . 
[Plrofit or loss is recognized in the case of exchanges of notes 
or securities, which are essentially like money; or in the case of 
stock in trade; or in the case the taxpayer exchanges the prop-
erty comprising his original investment for a different kind of 
property; but if the taxpayer's money is still tied up in the 
same kind of property as that in which it was originally in-
vested, he is not allowed to compute and deduct his theoretical 
loss on the exchange, nor is he charged with a tax upon his 
theoretical profit. The calculation of the profit or loss is de-
ferred until it is realized in cash, marketable securities, or 
other property not of the same kind having a fair market 
value. The Treasury Department states that its experience in-
dicates that this provision does not in fact result in tax avoid-
ance. If all exchanges were made taxable, it would be neces-
sary to evaluate the property received in exchange in 
thousands of horse trades and similar barter transactions each 
year, and for the time being, at least, claims for theoretical 
losses would probably exceed any profits which could be estab-
lished. The committee does not believe that the net revenue 
which could thereby be collected, particularly in these years, 
would justify the additional administrative expense. Conse-
quently, the exchange provisions have not been changed. 
H. R. REp. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2nd Sess. 1939-1 (1934). 
Some commentators argue that such allowance of formality to prevail over substance 
of a transaction has resulted in frustration of the legislative purpose behind § 1031. See 
generally Harrock, supra note 55. 
75. The House debates on the Revenue Act of 1924 indicate that gain must be recog-
nized if property is reduced to cash at any time during the transaction. 65 CONGo REc. 
2799 (1924). 
76. 385 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1967). 
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nonrecognition under section 1031 in cases, such as Starker II 
and Redwing Carriers involving sale-reinvestment transactionsY 
E. CONCLUSION 
It is difficult to ascertain the Ninth Circuit's intended scope 
on the nonsimultaneity issue. By failing to limit nonsimultane-
ous exchanges to months as in Redwing Carriers, as opposed to 
years as in Starker II, the court has paved the way for taxpayers 
to avoid taxation on a cash transaction. Finally, despite the 
court's unwillingness to apply a "substance over form" ap-
proach, this concept inherently exists in the court's holdings. As 
a result, taxpayers have added flexibility to the extent of timing 
and the kind of qualifying like-kind property. 
Carol M. Kingsley 
II. THE DAVIS DECISION: EXPANSION OF NON-
RECOGNITION OF INVOLUNTARY CONVERSIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
During the past term, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
was faced in Davis v. United States' with two important issues 
concerning nonrecognition of involuntary conversion. First, can a 
taxpayer who has invested condemnation proceeds in improve-
ments to previously purchased property qualify for nonrecogni-
tion of gain under section 1033 of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1954?2 Second, is subsection (a)3 or subsection (g)4 the proper 
77. Policy reasons may be raised as to the undersirability of such a result. Arguably. 
the holdings in Redwing Carriers and now Starker II, have extended § 1031 too far and 
perhaps are encouraging abuse under the Code. But see Harrock, supra note 55 for a 
discussion of the desirability of such an extension. 
1. 589 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. Jan., 1979)(per Wallace, J.; the other panel members were 
Chambers and Anderson, JJ.). 
2. I.R.C. § 1033 (1954). The predecessor was 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C. 1939) § 112(O(3)(A). 
3. I.R.C. § 1033(a)(3)(A) (1954) provides in part: 
(a) General rule. If property (as a result of its destruction in 
whole or in part, theft, seizure, or requisition or condemnation 
or threat or imminence thereoO is compulsorily or involuntarily 
converted- . . . . 
(3) Conversion into money where disposition occurred after 
1950.-Into money or into property not similar or related in 
service or use to the converted property ... the gain (if any) 
15
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vehicle for this expansion of section 1033? 
Affirming the district court's finding, the Ninth Circuit de-
cided that a taxpayer can qualify for nonrecognition of gain by 
maintaining a substantial continuation of its prior commitment 
of capital through appropriate improvements. Hence, investment 
by purchase of new real property is not necessary under section 
1033. Although the district court and the Ninth Circuit held for 
the taxpayer, their reasonings were different. Instea.d of examin-
ing the soundness of the lower court's application of the "like 
kind" test of subsection (g), the court of appeal went directly to 
subsection (a) and used the "similar or related in service or in 
use" standard. By doing so, the Ninth Circuit undoubtedly rein-
forced, as a matter of law, the broad applicability of this code 
section, but unfortunately for the tax practitioner, failed to pro-
vide much direction in the appropriate selection and use between 
subsections (a) and (g) and their respective tests. 
B. BACKGROUND 
In Davis, taxpayers reinvested proceeds from the condemna-
shall be recognized except to the extent hereinafter provided in 
this paragraph: 
(A) Nonrecognition of gain.-If the taxpayer during the pe· 
riod specified in subparagraph (B), for the purpose ofreplacing 
the property so converted, purchases other property similar or 
related in service or use to the property so converted, or pur· 
chases stock in the acquisition of control of a corporation own· 
ing such other property, at the election ofthe taxpayer the gain 
shall be recognized only to the extent that the amount realized 
upon such conversion (regardless of whether such amount is 
received in one or more taxable years) exceeds the cost of such 
other property or such stock. 
With minor modifications not relevant here, this section has been redesignated as section 
1033(a)(2)(A) by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94.455, § 1901(a)(128)(A),(B), 
90 Stat. 1785 (1976). 
4. I.R.C. § 1033(g)(l) (1954) provides: 
(g) Condemnation of real property held for productive use in 
trade or business or for investment.- (1) Special rule.-For 
purposes of subsection (a), if real property (not including stock 
in trade or other property held primarily for sale) held for pro· 
ductive use in trade or business or for investment is (as the 
result of its seizure, requisition, or condemnation, or threat or 
imminence thereof) compulsorily or involuntarily converted, 
property of a like kind to be held either for productive use in 
trade or business or for investment shall be treated as property 
similar or related in service or use to the property so converted. 
This section has been redesignated as § 1033(0(1) by the Tax Reform Act of 1976. Pub. 
L. No. 94·455, § 1901(a)(128)(C), 90 Stat. 1920 (1976). 
16
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tion of their agricultural and fishery property in improvements on 
their previously purchased industrial park.5 The improvements 
consisted of the installation of a storm drainage and water sys-
tem, the grading of land, and excavation of a roadway. 6 Reinvest-
ment was made within the requisite period prescribed in section 
1033(a)(3)(B).7 The Internal Revenue Service did not consider 
these expenditures to be qualified replacement property and as-
sessed a deficiency against taxpayers.s Taxpayers paid the addi-
5. As trustees of the estate of James Campbell, the taxpayers owned and leased real 
property at various locations in the state of Hawaii. The land included industrial and 
agricultural property, with a sea fishery adjacent to the agricultural property. In the will 
of James Campbell, trustees were admonished to keep the land intact and not to sell it 
unless it was in the best interest of the trust. As a result, the trustees had established and 
consistently followed a policy of leasing trust lands while continually improving the land 
for purposes of increasing the production of income. Since 1901, the Campbell trustees 
had sold less than 4% of the land in private sales. See Brief for Appellees, Davis v. United 
States, 589 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1979). 
In the late 1960's and early 1970's portions of taxpayers' agricultural land were con-
demned by the state for the construction of highways. As a result of the condemnations, 
plaintiffs realized a net amount exceeding $260,000 during the years 1966, 1968, and 1971. 
Taxpayers realized an additional $7,700 in 1970 from the condemnation of a fishing area 
and land zoned for agriculture. Again, in 1971, an additional $25,000 was realized from 
the condemnation of the fishery. 
Taxpayers' leased lands, which had been condemned for highway purposes, had been 
used primarily for livestock grazing and the cultivation of sugar cane. Most of the condem-
nation proceeds from these lands were used in the regular course of the estate's business 
operations. However, in 1972, taxpayers expended approximately $335,800 in permanent 
improvements in land they owned at Campbell Industrial Park. Davis v. United States, 
411 F. Supp. at 964-65 (1976). 
6. Taxpayers reinvested $296,154.06. This included: $171,000 for land grading; 
$36,849.60 for a storm drainage system; $79,380 for a water system; and $48,600 for road-
way excavation. Although the total cost of the improvements was $335,829.60, the amount 
of condemnation funds used for improvements was $296,154.06. The difference, 
$40,675.54, was paid out of the taxpayers' general business funds. See Brief for Appellees, 
supra note 5. 
7. Pursuant to the provisions of § 1033(a)(3)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of1954, 
the time for purchasing qualified replacement property so as to allow taxpayers to qualify 
for nonrecognition with respect to their gain on the condemnations, had been extended to 
December 31,1973. See Brief for Appellant, Davis v. United States, 589 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 
1979). 
The time period specified by § 1033 usually begins with the date of the disposition of 
the converted property, or the earliest date of threat of condemnation, whichever is the 
earlier, and ending-
(i) 2 years after the close of the first taxable year in which any part of the gain is 
realized, or 
(ii) subject to such terms, conditions and later dates as may be specified by the 
Secretary on taxpayer's application. 
8. The Internal Revenue Service reasoned that because the investments were im-
provements on land already owned by taxpayers, it did not qualify as replacement prop-
erty under § 1033. 
17
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tional tax plus interest' and filed timely claims for refunds. Fol-
lowing the administrative denial of the refund claims, suit was 
subsequently filed in the district court. 
C. NONRECOGNITION OF GAIN UNDER SECTION l033(G): THE "LIKE 
KIND" TEST 
Legislative History 
In determining whether gain is to be recogni~ed from the 
investment of condemnation proceeds into improvements to real 
property, two tests have been used by the courts.IO Both tests are 
provided in section 1033 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code. 
Under section 1033(a)(2)(A)1I gain is not recognized on involun-
tarily converted property if the replacement property is similar 
or related in use to the converted property.12 The scope of this 
nonrecognition provision was extended under section 1033(g) 13 
which allows the broader "like kind" test to be applied in situa-
tions involving condemned real property. Previous to the new 
law, involuntary conversions of property resulting from condem-
nation which was held either for productive use in trade or busi-
ness or for investment was subject to the same strict constraints 
of subsection (a).14 Consequently, inequities resulted whereby 
9. The amount attributed to the condemnation proceeds was $106,050. 589 F.2d at 
447. 
10. Although courts have typically applied two tests for the nonrecognition of invol· 
untary conversions, the Internal Revenue Service applies an additional third test. Apart 
from the "like kind" test, the Service has divided the "similar in service or use" test into 
two discrete tests. The basis of the division as set forth in Revenue Ruling 64·237, 1964·2 
C.B. 319, is the distinction between two classes of owners: owner·users and owner·lessors. 
A "functional" test applies to owner·users of property. Id. at 319·320. For owner· lessors, 
the test focuses more on the relationship of the lessor to both the converted property and 
the replacement property. Id. at 320. For a discussion of the uncertainty of standards 
resulting in poor tax planning see Comment, Involuntary Conversions and the Question 
of Qualified Replacement Property, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 331 (1977). 
11. For the text of § 1033(a)(2)(A), see note 3 supra. 
12. See note 25 and 26 infra, and accompanying text. 
13. For the text of § 1033(g), see note 4 supra. Section 1033(g) was added to the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 by amendment in 1958. Section 46(a), Technical Amend· 
ment Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 1641. 
14. Section 1033 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code provides for the nonrecognition 
of gain or loss where the proceeds of property involuntarily converted are reinvested in 
"property similar or related in service or use to the property so converted." The courts 
construe that phrase very strictly to require that the property be very similar in economic 
usage to the property destroyed, condemned or otherwise involuntarily converted. J. RAB· 
KIN AND M. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, GIFI' AND ESTATE TAXATION § 43.08 (1954). The 
construction given to the similar property requirement of section 1033 was much stricter 
than the construction given to the phrase "property of a like kind" in the case of exchanges 
18
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persons who voluntarily traded property were afforded much 
more freedom than persons who involuntarily parted with prop-
erty.15 Many landowners whose property was condemned by rea-
son of changing social and economic factors were faced with the 
choice of either reinvesting their proceeds in land which qualified 
under the requirements of subsection (a), but which was in an 
entirely different geographic area, or of paying the gains tax. The 
spirit of section 1033 was to protect taxpayers from taxation of all 
involuntarily realized income if they took steps to replace the 
converted property in such a way as to represent a continuity in 
investment. Subsection (g) was added to specifically protect the 
interests of landowners subjected to real property condemnation. 
The District Court Decision 
Since taxpayers' improvements were not of the "same gen-
eral class"" as the condemned agricultural land, the improve-
ments did not qualify for nonrecognition of gain as "property 
similar or related in service or use" within the meaning of section 
1033(a)(3)(A). Rather the district court concluded that the im-
provements were "like kind" and that taxpayers could elect to 
defer recognition of gain under subsection (g). The court looked 
to section 1.1031(a)-1(b) of the Treasury Regulations17 which has 
of property held for investment or for productive use in a trade or business. [d. § 43.10(2). 
See Thompson, Liberalization of Rules Prouiding for Tax Free Treatment of Reinuestment 
of Proceeds of Condemnation Award, 1959 So. CALIF. TAX !NST. 52. 
15. For example, the owner of a farm might exchange his farm for income producing 
real property without recognition of gain. H, on the other hand, the farm was condemned, 
the proceeds could not be invested in income real estate without the realization of gain. 
[d. 
16. This was a phrase first used in Steuart Brothers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 
580 (4th Cir. 1958). Steuart Brothers, was also the first of a series of cases that established 
the rule that considered the investment character of property to be important in the 
qualification of replacement property under § 1033(a)(2)(A). In Steuart Brothers, tax-
payer was engaged in a real estate business and owned a tract of land that he planned to 
rent as a warehouse or grocery store. After the property was condemned, taxpayer bought 
two new properties, both of which were rental properties. In reversing the Tax Court, the 
Fourt Circuit,compared the real estate held by the taxpayer before and after the conver-
sion. The court concluded that real estate held for investment is similar or related in 
service or use if the reinvestment is in real estate of the "same general class." However, 
the court gave no elucidation on what it meant by that phrase. This approach was ap-
proved in S.E. Ponticos, Inc. v. Commissioner, 338 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1964). 
The district court in Dauis relied on Filippini v. United States, 200 F. Supp. 286 (N.D. 
Cal. 1961). In Filippini, a farm and drive-in theater were replaced by urban lots on which 
taxpayer erected an office building. The lower court held that the replacement property 
was not of the "same general class" as the condemned property and therefore was not 
"similar or related in service or use" within the meaning of subsection (a). [d. at 294. 
17. The term "like kind" was first used in section 1031 ofthe Internal Revenue Code 
19
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defined "like kind" as referring to "the nature or character of the 
property and not to its grade or quality."18 For further clarifica-
tion, the court cited Commissioner v. Crichton lU which stated 
that "the distinction intended and made by the statute is the 
broad one between classes and characters of properties, for in-
stance, between real and personal property."20 Therefore, since 
both their improvements and their condemned property were real 
property, taxpayers qualified for nonrecognition under the defini-
tion of "like kind." 
Additionally, the lower court looked to the purpose of the 
statute and whether or not the improvements made by taxpayers 
"re-establishes [their] prior commitment of capital. "21 Code sec-
tion 1033 is to be liberally construed to accomplish this purpose. 
Referring to Filippini v. United States,22 the court pointed out 
that under the "like kind" test, "it appears that the replacement 
of one investment property for another investment property, 
without regard to any dissimilarity of characteristics or uses, 
would be allowable."23 Thus, in keeping with the spirit of the 
Code, the lower court found that taxpayers made a substantial 
continuation of their prior commitment of capital and specifi-
of 1954 which provides nonrecognition for voluntary exchanges of "like kind" property. 
For the application of this section, the test is set forth in Treas. Reg. § 1.1031{a)-(1)(b) 
(1979). Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(g)-(1)(a) (1979) has adopted this same test to be used in the 
application of I.R.C. § 1033(g). 
18. The definition of "like kind" in Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(b) further provides: 
one kind of class of property may not, under that section, be .138 
exchanged for property of a different kind or class. The fact 139 
that any real estate involved is improved or unimproved is not 140 
material, for that fact relates only to the grade or quality of the 141 
property and not to its kind or class. 
19. 122 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1941). In Crichton, taxpayer exchanged her undivided 
interest in rights to oil, gas, and other minerals, all produced from rural lands, for undi-
vided interests in a hotel. Using a broad interpretation of "like kind," the court held the 
exchange non-taxable under section 112(b)(1), Rev. Act of 1936, predecessor to I.R.C. § 
1031(a). [d. at 182. 
20. For the broad construction given the term "like kind" see Alabama By-Products 
Corp. v. Patterson, 258 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1958); Fleming v. Campbell, 205 F.2d 549 (5th 
Cir. 1953). See also 3 J. MERTENS, THE LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 20.171, at 803 
(rev. ed. J. Malone 1972); Rev. Rul. 55-749, 1955-2 C.B. 295; Rev. Rul. 70-511, 1970-2 
C.B.l66. 
21. Filippini v. United States, 318 F.2d 841, 844 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922 
(1963). 
22. 200 F. Supp. 286 (N.D. Cal. 1961). 
23. Id. at 294. However, because the amended § 1033(g) was made expressly applica-
ble only to the involuntary conversions of real estate occurring after the date of the 
taxpayers' conversion, the taxpayers in Fillipini could not benefit from the new amend-
ment. 
20
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cally, that their improvements qualified for nonrecognition under 
the requirements of subsection (g). 
D. CONTINUITY OF INVESTMENT UNDER SECTION l033(a): THE 
"SIMILAR OR RELATED IN USE" STANDARD 
Given taxpayers' substantial continuation of their prior com-
mitment of capital, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court 
erred in concluding that improvements to the park were not 
"similar or related in service or in use" to their prior investment 
in agricultural land. Part of the basis of the court's opinion rested 
on public policy reasons which were attributed to the district 
court. Some attention was also given to additional factors identi-
fied as reasons for the lower court's granting a refund to taxpay-
ers. The bulk of the opinion, however, concentrated on the appro-
priate use of the requirements in Filippini for determining .the 
applicability of subsection (a). Whether or not the district court 
correctly granted relief under subsection (g) was a question never 
reached by the appeals court.24 
Agreement with the "Unstated Opinion" of the District Court 
In part, the Ninth Circuit attributed the district court's 
granting of a refund on several public policy reasons. First, it was 
virtually impossible for taxpayers to reinvest in agricultural land 
with an adjacent sea fishery. Hawaii had declared a public policy 
of absorbing ownership of sea fisheries into the public domain. 
Additionally, the state's plantation economy had changed to a 
mixed industrial, commercial, resort, and agricultural economy. 
What little agricultural land was available, would be unafforda-
ble to prospective agricultural tenants. 
The court of appeal also credited the lower court with the 
following reasons for their judgment. Virtually the same risk was 
attendant to taxpayers' investment in the Industrial Park as 
would have been in an investment in agricultural property. The 
cost of managing either industrial or agricultural tenants was 
substantially the same also. Finally, since taxpayers did not pro-
vide substantial management services to either the industrial or 
24. As the court noted, even if it disagreed with the reasoning of the district judge, 
it could affirm the lower court's disposition "on any ground squarely presented on the 
record." 589 F.2d 446, 448 n.3. See Grosz v. Andrus, 556 F.2d 972, 974 n.3 (9th Cir. 1977); 
M.O.S. Corp. v. John I. Haas Co., 375 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1967); see also Jaffke v. 
Dunham, 352 U.S. 280, 281 (1957) (per curiam). 
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agricultural tenants, the services provided were essentially 
alike.25 
Interestingly enough, the Ninth Circuit enumerated all of the 
above reasons as the basis for taxpayers' refund granted by the 
district court. Yet the district court judge did not expressly in-
clude any of these factors in his opinion. 
The Filippini Influence 
In Filippini v. United States, 28 the taxpayer purchased urban 
property and erected an office building using money received 
from the condemnation of substantially rural property. The dis-
trict court compared the characteristics and uses of the two prop-
erties and, after finding that the properties were dissimilar and 
not even of the "same general class," refused to allow nonrecogni-
tion of the taxpayer's gain. However, when the district court ap-
plied the same line of reasoning in Davis, the Ninth Circuit found 
the judgment in error. Rather the court interpreted Filippini to 
not require that the replacement property be of the "same general 
class" as the condemned property before it can qualify under 
subsection (a). 27 
Instead, the court adopted a long-established test to deter-
mine the applicability of subsection (a). 
The test is a practical one. The trier of fact must 
determine from all the circumstances whether the 
taxpayer has achieved a sufficient continuity of 
investment to justify nonrecognition of the gain, 
or whether the differences in the relationship of 
the taxpayer to the two investments are such as 
to compel the conclusion that he has taken adan-
tage of the condemnation to alter the nature of his 
investment for his own purposes.28 
25. All of these factors listed as reasons for the district court's judgment are factors 
which Filippini, 318 F.2d 841, requires in determining the applicability of the "similar or 
related in use" test. See notes 29 to 31 infra, and accompanying text. 
26. 318 F.2d 841 (9th Cir.),cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963). 
27. The court specifically rejected resolution of the issue by "simplistic talismanic 
rules." Rather, the court again emphasized the importance of using the test which com-
pares all of the circumstances surrounding the two investments. That taxpayers' con-
demned agricultural land is not of the "same general class" a8 its improvements to the 
park is thus not determinative. Rather, taxpayers' relationship to the two investments 
controls. 589 F.2d at 450. 
28. 1d. at 449, quoting Filippini v. United States, 318 F.2d 841,844-45 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963). 
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To meet the requirements of Filippini the court of appeal 
considered a broad range of factors in determining taxpayer's 
relationship to both the condemned and replacement property in 
order to find a sufficient continuity of investment.28 Since the 
taxpayers held both the condemned and the replacement proper-
ties to generate rental income, the inquiry specifically included 
"the extent and type of the lessor's management activity, the 
amount and kind of services rendered by him to the tenants, and 
the nature of his business risks connected with the properties."30 
General factors which influence the choice of any investment, 
such as the character of the particular properties and the market 
of which each is a part, were examined as well.3t After applying 
the test to the facts of the instant case, the Ninth Circuit stated 
that taxpayers were entitled to relief under subsection (a).32 
E. SIGNIFICANCE 
The most important practical outcome of the Davis decision 
is that it substantially broadens the tax opportunities available 
to a taxpayer replacing involuntarily converted real property. In 
Davis, taxpayers, as recipients of a condemnation award, 
expended their proceeds for improvements on land that they al-
ready owned. Both the lower court and the Ninth Circuit held the 
property eligible for nonrecognition; although it generally has 
been held that a purchase of new replacement property is neces-· 
29. The Internal Revenue Service originally took the position that the statutory 
phrase, "similar or related in service or use" meant that the property acquired had to have 
a close "functional" similarity to the property converted. Under this test, the physical 
characteristics and the end use of the converted and replacement properties had to be 
similar. See Loco Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 306 F.2d 207, 211·14 (8th Cir. 1962). The 
Ninth Circuit and several other courts of appeals, however, rejected this approach. Filip· 
pini v. United States, 318 F.2d 841, 844·45 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963); 
Clifton Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 719, 721·22 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 
921 (1963); Pohn v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 427, 429-30 (7th Cir. 1962); Loco Realty Co. 
v. Commissioner, 306 F.2d at 215 (8th Cir. 1962); Liant Record, Inc. v. Commission, 303 
F.2d 326, 328-29 (2d Cir. 1962); Steuart Bros., Inc. v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 580, 584 
(4th Cir. 1958). The Service therefore reconsidered its position in regard to property held 
for investment, and now focuses attention on "the similarity in the relationship of the 
services or uses which the original and replacement properties have to the taxpayer-
owner." Rev. Rul. 64-237, 1964-2 C.B. 319, 320. The tax court has also adopted this test. 
See Wheeler v. Comm'r ofInternal Revenue, 58 T.C. 459, 463 (1972); Johnson v. Commis-
sioner, 43 T.C. 736, 741 (1965). See also 589 F.2d 446, 449 n.8. 
30. [d. at 449. See also Filippini v. United States, 318 F.2d at 845, quoting Liant 
Record, Inc. v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 326, 329 (2d Cir. 1962). 
31. 589 F.2d at 449. 
32. [d. 
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sary to qualify under 1033.33 
As the Ninth Circuit illustrated in its opinion, the facts of the 
Davis case clearly qualified for nonrecognition within the spirit 
of the Code. Public Policy and the changing economic base of the 
state of Hawaii were correctly considered in deciding the case. 
The court's application of both the "similar or related in use" test 
and its flexible interpretation of Filippini, 34 not to require replace-
ment property to be of the "same general class," were reasonable. 
All of the' circumstances surrounding taxpayers' relationships to 
their investments had remained essentially the same. Thus, the 
appeals court's decision seemed clearly correct that in keeping 
with subsection (a), taxpayers' investment represents a sufficient 
continuation of their original investment. 
Yet, there are several omissions which limit the usefulness of 
the Davis opinion. For years tax practitioners have struggled with 
the lack of clear guidelines for determining whether subsection 
(a) or (g) is the appropriate section to apply to qualify for nonre-
cognition of gain. 3G The Ninth Circuit's inattentiveness to these 
issues resulted in its loss of an opportunity to clarify some of this 
confusion. To the relative exclusion of all other authority, the 
court relied on Filippini in deciding Davis. 36 Most emphasized 
was the test used for determining the applicability of subsection 
(a). From the application of the "similar or related in service or 
use" test, the court concluded that taxpayers' reinvestment qual-
33. Before replacement property can qualify for nonrecognition under either subsec-
tions (a) or (g) of section 1033, it must first meet the requirement of having been acquired 
by "purchase". In Davis, taxpayers conceded that they did not "purchase" land in re-
placement of the condemned land. Rather, taxpayers "expended" money for imp~ove­
ments on other land which they already owned. 
Following the reasoning of the court in Dettmers v. Commissioner, 430 F.2d 1019 (6th 
Cir. 1970), the district court was satisfied that the expenditures made by the taxpayers 
in Davis met the "purchase" requirement. In Dettmers, the court traced the legislative 
history of § 1033(a)(3). The court concluded that when the requirement that proceeds from 
the involuntary conversion be "expended" was replaced by timely "purchase," no sub-
stantive change was intended in the nature of the relief afforded under the statute. Addi-
tiona\)y, the court believed that the reason the language wos changed from "acquisition" 
to "purchase" was that "Congress wanted to specify that the acquisition be by purchase 
rather than, for example, by gift or devise." Id. at 1022. 
34. See note 27 supra, and accompanying text. 
35. See generally Wi11is & Steinmann, Davis Decision May Increase Flexibility in 
Replacing Involuntarily Converted Real Property, 56 TAXES 272 (1978); and Comment, 
Involuntary Conversions and the Question of Qualified Replacement Property, 38 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 331 (1977). 
36. See cases cited at notes 37 and 38 infra. 
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ified for nonrecognition under subsection (a). In reinforcing its 
decision, the court reiterated, again from Filippini, that the pur-
pose of section 1033 "is to relieve the taxpayer of unanticipated 
tax liability arising from involuntary conversion of his property 
.... The statute is to be liberally construed to accomplish this 
purpose. "37 Numerous cases and revenue rulings have addressed 
and decided controversies relating to the application of section 
1033, many of which were used persuasively in counsels' argu-
ments.3S Yet the court ignored even the most relevant of these.3t 
Despite the court's holding being in complete agreement 
with Revenue Ruling 67-255,40 this and all other pertinent rulings 
were left unacknowledged.4• In Revenue Ruling 67-255, the Inter-
nal Revenue Service held that, "[l]and is not of the same nature 
or character as a building, or a storm drain, or a water system, 
or a road."42 Thus, such improvements as these, on property al-
ready owned, were not deemed to qualify under the definition of 
"like kind." Rather, the facts were to be applied to the "similar 
37. 589 F.2d at 450 (1979). See also Pontic08, Inc. v. Commissioner, 338 F.2d 477, 479 
(6th Cir. 1964); Filippini v. United States, 318 F.2d 841, 844 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 
U.S. 922 (1963); Loco Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 306 F.2d 207, 215 (8th Cir. 1962). 
38. See Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, 356 U.S. 260 (1958); Alabama By-Products Corp. 
v. Patterson, 258 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1958); Fleming v. Campbell, 205 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 
1953); Commissioner v. Crichton, 122 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1941); Rev. Rul. 73-120, 1973-1 
C.B. 369; Rev. Rul. 70-511, 1970-2 C.B. 166; Rev. Rul. 68-394, 1968-2 C.B. 338; and Rev. 
Rul. 67-255, 1967-2 C.B. 270. 
39. Fleming v. Campbell, 205 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1953); Commissioner v. Crichton, 
122 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1941); and Rev. Rul. 67-255, 1967-2 C.B. 270. 
40. [d. at 271. Taxpayer constructed a building on land already owned. The IRS held 
that neither the building nor storm drains, water systems and roads constructed on land 
already owned qualified as replacement property under § 1033(g) a8 being of a like kind 
to the land converted involuntarily. However, reference is made to Rev. Rul. 67-254,1967-
2 C.B. 269. Here investment of part of the proceeds of an involuntary conversion, in the 
construction of a garage on property already owned, qualified as replacement property 
under § 1033(a)(3)(A). 
tv 
41. See also Rev. Rul. 76-391, 1976-2 C.B. 243 (construction of commercial building 
on land already owned by taxpayer held not to qualify as property of like kind to con-
demned farmland); Rev. Rul. 76-390, 1976-2 C.B. 243 (construction of motel on remaining 
portion of property held not to qualify as property of like kind to condemned mobile home 
park); Rev. Rul. 73-120, 1973-1 C.B. 369 (held that replacement of a utility company's 
water plant and appurtenant pipe lines, mains, etc., with 8 large apartment complex 
qualified as a like kind replacement); Rev. Rul. 71-41, 1971-1 C.B. 223 (construction of 
gas station on land already owned by taxpayer held not to qualify as property of like kind 
to condemned land and warehouse construction); Rev. Rul. 67-254,1967-2 C.B. 269, (held 
that construction of improvements may be treated as a purchase of qualifying replacement 
property under section 1033(a) for condemned improved land where such improvements 
are "related in service or use" to the condemned improvements). 
42. [d. at 270. 
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or related use" test of subsection (a). This was precisely the 
course followed by the Ninth Circuit, but no indication was given 
showing that to be its intention. 
Finally, the most glaring shortcoming of the opinion was its 
lack of attention to subsection (g). Some investments may fall 
within the purview of both subsection (a) and subsection (g), 
though the focus of inquiry to determine the applicability of each 
subsection differ.4s However, in its analysis, the court went di-
rectly to section 1033(a) and applied the test in Filippini.44 After 
finding that the taxpayers qualified for relief under subsection 
(a), the court did not even reach the question of whether the 
district court correctly granted relief under subsection (g). In 
light of the expressed legislative intent of subsection (g), when 
added to the Code and the interpretation of its application by 
Revenue Ruling 67-255,41 the district court quite logically rea-
soned the application of subsection (g) in this case. Considering 
the confusion that is enshrouded around the use of the subsection, 
the Ninth Circuit should have examined the lower court's appli-
cation of subsection (g) and have provided a definitive statement 
to tax practitioners as to the appropriate selection and use of 
subsections (a) or (g) for nonrecognition of involuntary conver-
sions. 
CONCLUSION 
From Davis it is now clear that construction of improvements 
on land owned by a taxpayer is a qualified replacement of con-
verted land under section 1033. At least such is the case when the 
involuntary conversion is due to condemnation of property by the 
government. The "similar or related in use" test can be success-
fully applied for determining nonrecognition under subsection 
(a); since that was the vehicle used by the Ninth Circuit for this 
expansion of section 1033. However, still in question is whether 
this same type of replacement could qualify for nonrecognition 
under the "like kind" provisions of subsection (g). 
Carol M. Kingsley 
43. 589 F.2d at 448. 
44. See note 28 supra _ and accompanying text. 
45. See the discussions of- the legislative history of 0 1033(g) at notes 13 to 15, and 
note 42 supra, and accompanying text. 
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III. DEDUCTffiILITY OF START-UP COSTS OF BANK 
CREDIT CARD PROGRAMS 
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
In First Security Bank u. Commissioner, I the Ninth Circuit 
held that costs initially incurred for participation in a national 
bank credit card system constituted ordinary and necessary ex-
penses in carrying on a trade or business.2 
For the 1966 taxable year, the First Security Bank of Idaho 
and the First Security Bank of Utah (the taxpayers) deducted 
fees paid to Bank-Americard Service Corporation under an 
agreement instituting a bank credit card system. The disputed 
deductions involved, for each bank, an initial, non-recurring 
payment of $12,500. Of this amount, $7,500 was allotted to the 
costs of a computer program and servicing. The other $5,000 cov-
ered costs for operating manuals, advertising and publicity aids, 
marketing "know-how," forms and agreements, training sessions 
and other instructions in setting up and running a credit card 
operation.3 
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner or 
the Government) disallowed each deduction of $12,500, main-
tdining that the cost should have been capitalized since it was 
for a franchise right of indefinite duration. 4 The taxpayers filed a . 
petition in Tax Court where the Commissioner argued that the 
expenditures were non-deductible pre-operating costs associated 
with the banks' entrance into a new line of business, or in the 
alternative, the costs were capital expenditures providing future 
economic benefits of' an unknown duration.s The Tax Court, 
however, ruled against the Government and held that the costs 
were fully deductible.' 
1. 592 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. Mar., 1979) (per Kilkenny, J.; the other panel members 
were Duniway, J. and Belloni, D.J.). 
2. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1954) provides: "(a) In General-There shall be allowed as a de-
duction all the ordinary and nece88ary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year 
in carrying on any trade or busine88 . . . ." 
3. 592 F.2d at 1051. For a more complete description of the agreement entered into 
and the items for which expenditures were made, see Rolph and Ruempler, Bank Credit 
Cards: The IRS 'New Business' Gambit, 93 BANKING L.J. 269,' 273-77 (1976). 
4.Id. 
5. 63 T.C. 644, 649 (1975). 
6. Id. at 649·51. The Tax Court cited Jack E. Golsen v. Commi88ioner, 54 T.C. 742 
(1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 985 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971), in which it an-
nounced its policy of making decisions in accordance with the circuit to which the case 
27
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of whether 
the initial cost of participation in a bank credit card system con-
stituted ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in carrying on 
a trade or business, deductible under section 162(a)7 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code. In affirming the Tax Court's decision, the 
court stated, without elaboration, that it adopted the decision of 
the Tenth Circuit in Colorado Springs National Bank v. United 
States8 as the law of the Ninth Circuit.9 It specifically approved 
two other cases, First National Bank v. United States lO and 
Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v. United States,1I which in-
volved banks joining credit card programs. '2 
This Note will examine the Ninth Circuit's decision in First 
Security Bank as a part of a growing trend permitting deduct-
ibility of expenditures where no identifiable asset has been pur-
chased or created. In addition, this Note will reveal the judici-
ary's reluctance to deny deductibility of start-up costs in 
developing new markets or new products by going concerns. '3 
would be appealable. In First Security Bank, the taxpayers' cases were consolidated. 
Since one taxpayer was a Utah corporation, an adverse ruling would have been appealed 
to the Tenth Circuit which had previously decided the issues in favor of the taxpayer. 
See Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1974). The 
Tax Court specifically noted that it was making no determination "as to our policy 
should we be faced with consolidated cases appealable to more than one circuit in which 
one of those circuits has spoken on a particular issue and we disagree with said circuit's 
position." 63 T.C. at 650 n.19. 
7. 592 F.2d at 1051. For the relevant language of § 162(a), see text accompanying 
note 14 infra. 
8. 505 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1974). 
9. 592 F.2d at 1052. 
10. 558 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1977). 
11. 68 T.C. 872 (1972), aff'd, 592 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1979). 
12. The facts and issues presented in First Security Bank v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 
1050 (9th Cir. 1979); First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 558 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1977); 
Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1974); and Iowa-
Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. United States, 68 T.C. 872 (1972), aff'd, 592 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 
1979), were essentially the same and will be hereafter referred to as "the bank credit card 
cases." 
13. The Internal Revenue Service (the IRS or Service) has pursued these issues ag-
gressively with other types of businesses. Therefore, the reasoning in the bank credit card 
cases has application beyond that class of taxpayer. See, e.g., Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. 
Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973) (expansion of a distribution system of a candy 
company); Madison Gas & Elec. Co., [1979] TAX CT. REp. DEC. (P-R) 72-284 (training 
expenses prior to operation of a nuclear power plant operated by the taxpayer and others 
as a joint venture); Jack's Cookie Co. v. United States, 597 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1979) 
(lease reserve payments made to a local government by a cookie company). At the time 
of First Security Bank, there were approximately 4,000 banks being challenged on the 
credit card start-up costs issues. 
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B. WERE THE BANKS ENTEmNG A NEW TRADE OR BUSINESS? 
In order for an expenditure to be currently deductible under 
section 162(a) of the 1954 Code, "an item must (1) be 'paid or 
incurred during the taxable year,' (2) be for 'carrying on any 
trade or business,' (3) be an 'expense,' (4) be a 'necessary' ex-
pense, and (5) be an 'ordinary' expense}· In the bank credit card 
cases,15 the Government never contended that the costs were not 
paid or incurred during the taxable year or that the costs were 
not a "necessary" expense." Rather, the Government argued 
that the costs were start-up costs of a new business activity and, 
therefore, not deductible. It also argued that the expenditures 
were not "ordinary" expenses within the meaning of the Internal 
Revenue Code. 
New Trade or Business Theory 
In support of its first contention that the credit card system 
start-up costs were not deductible because the banks were enter-
ing a new trade or business, the Commissioner relied on Rich-
mond Television Corp. v. United States. 17 In Richmond Televi-
14. Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Aas'n, 403 U.S. 345, 352 (1971). 
15. See note 12 supra. 
16. In Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Aas'n, 403 U.S. 345, 358, the Supreme 
Court stated: "Our decisions have consistently construed the term 'necessary' as impos-
ing only the minimal requirement that the expense be 'appropriate and helpful' for 'the 
development of the [taxpayer's] busineBB.' " 
17. 345 F.2d 901 (4th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68 (1965). In Rich-
mond Television no real problem was posed by expenditures which would have had to be 
capitalized regardless of when they were incurred. The difficult question involved costs 
which would have been currently deductible if incurred after the busineBB became a "go-
ing concern." The court stated: 
1d. at 905. 
The issue therefore is at what point of time did [the tax· 
payer's] business begin .... While decisions are to be found 
holding that particular taxpayers were or were not engaged in 
a trade or business, there is little discussion of the question of 
when, in point of time, a trade or business actually begins. 
The Regulations issued under § 162 do not define what constitutes "carrying on a 
trade or business:" In Snow v. Commissioner, 416 U.S. 500 (1974), the Supreme Court 
contrasted the words "carrying on a trade or busineBB" under § 162(a) with § 174(a)(1) 
allowing deductions for experimental expenditures paid or incurred "in connection with a 
trade or busineBB." The Court held the taxpayer was entitled to such deductions prior to 
the point where the product was marketable, stating that § 162 was "not helpful" in 
defining "in connection with a trade or busine88" since it was "more narrowly written." 
1d. at 503. 
Compare the holding in Richmond Television with Treasury regulations i88ued under 
I.R.C. §§ 248 and 355. Section 248 provides that a corporation may elect to deduct its 
organizational expenditures over a period not le88 than 60 months beginning in the 
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sion, the taxpayer had applied to the Federal Communications 
Commission (F.C.C.) for a license to operate a television station. 
A competitor had also applied for a license in the same area. 
Prior to receiving F.C.C. approval, the taxpayer bought out its 
competitor by reimbursing it for costs incurred in training televi-
sion station operators. The taxpayer also incurred further train-
ing expenses before it went on the air. It deducted all these costs 
in the tax year prior to its receiving its broadcasting license.lS 
The Fourth Circuit held that a taxpayer "has not 'engaged in 
carrying on any trade or business' within the intendment of sec-
tion 162(a) until such time as the business has begun to function 
as a going concern and performed those activities for which it 
was organized,"18 and, therefore the court denied the deduction. 
month that the corporation began business. Treas. Reg. § 1.248-1(a)(3) (1956) provides: 
The determination of the date the corporation begins business 
presents a question of fact which must be determined in each 
case in light of all the circumstances of the particular case. 
The words "begins business," however, do not have the same 
meaning as "in existence." Ordinarily, a corporation begins 
business when it starts the business operations for which it was 
organized .... If the activities of the corporation have ad-
vanced to the extent necessary to establish the nature of its 
business operations, however, it will be deemed to have begun 
business. For example, the acquisition of operating assets 
which are necessary to the type of business contemplated may 
constitute the beginning of business. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.355-l(c) (1955), defines an "active business" for purposes of a distri-
bution of stock of a controlled corporation. 
[Flor purposes of section 355, a trade or business consists of a 
specific existing group of activities being carried on for the 
purpose of earning income or profit from only such group of 
activities, and the activities included in such group must in-
clude every operation which forms a part of, or a step in, the 
process of earning income or profit from such group. Such 
group of activities ordinarily must include the collection of in-
come and the payment of expenses. 
18. 345 F.2d at 904. 
19. The $25,799.19 paid to acquire the competitor's trained staff was deemed "the 
acquisition of a capital asset whose value to the taxpayer would continue for many years, 
even though from time to time individual staff members could be expected to leave its 
employ. Id. at 907. Accord, Radio Station WBIR v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 803 (1959) 
(legal and engineering fees, travel and other expenses of prosecuting its applications for 
an F.C.C. license); KWTX Broadcasting Co. v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 952 (1959), aff'd 
per curiam, 272 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1959) (payment to competitor to dismiss its applica-
tion for an F.C.C. license held to be in the nature of obtaining an intangible asset); 
Frank B. Polachek v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 858 (1954) (costs incurred in planning a new 
business investment advisory service); Peters berg Television Corp. v. Commissioner, 20 
T.C.M. (P-H)~ 271 (1961) (costs related to seeking television license). The Fourth Circuit 
found particularly instructive Cohn v. United States, 57-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9457 
(D.C.W.n. Tenn. 1957), aff'd on other grounds, 259 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1958) (training, 
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In the bank credit card cases, the Commissioner attempted 
to extend this reasoning to new business activities undertaken by 
going concerns.20 Only the Colorado Springs court discussed the 
issue thoroughly.21 In Colorado Springs, the Tenth Circuit found 
that the credit card system enabled the banks "to carryon an 
old business in a l1ew waY,"22 for example, by simplifying the 
procedures for granting loans on merchants' accounts receivables 
and on extending credit for personal consumer loans.23 The court 
distinguished Richmond Television on the ground that the tax-
legal and other expenses incurred prior to the opening of aviator training schools). 
The holding in Richmond Television has been criticized. Erbacher, Start-Up Costs: 
Are They Deductible by a Corporation for Federal Income Tax Purposes? 48 TAXES 488 
(1970); Solomon, Tax Treatment of Pre-Opening Expenses, 46 TAXES 521 (1968). In J. 
Rabkin & M. Johnson, Federal Income Gift and Estate Taxation § 3.02 (1963 & Supp. 
1980), the authors sta~e: "The Fourth Circuit has adopted the unrealistic rule that 'carry-
ing on' a trade or business requires the performance of the ultimate activities for which 
the business was organized." 
For other articles dealing with the subject of deductibility of start-up costs, see Bu-
ell, Business Start Up Costs: Analyzing and Planning for Current Deductibility, 43 J. 
TAX. 278 (1975); Mandell, Deductibility of Pre-Operating Expenses: Successful and Un-
successful Ventures, 25 N.Y.U. mST. FED. TAX. 1235 (1967); Seago, THE TAX TREATMENT 
OF START-UP COSTS, 9 TAX ADVISER 410 (1978). 
20. The Commissioner has not been very successful with the extension of the theory. 
E.g., Hillcone Steamship Co. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 1096 (1963) where a 
steamship company was permitted to deduct costs of raising hops, pasturing cattle, leas-
ing stone quarries and cutting timber because these activities constituted a part of the 
operations of a farm purchased by the taxpayer and were not an effort to enter separate 
businesses. Realtors who concentrate in one area of real estate, such as residential real 
estate, may deduct expenses incurred in entering a different area of expertise, such as 
commercial real estate. Malmstadt v. Commissioner, 578 F.2d 520 (4th Cir. 1978); York 
v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1958). See also Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Com-
missioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1184 (1977), where the Tax Court held that a subsidiary, 
organized to sell annuity life insurance contracts, had actually begun carrying on busi-
ness when it made a private sale of such insurance to its parent's pension fund. "[The 
taxpayer's] business was not limited to public sales of insurance and annuity contracts, 
but simply sales of such contracts." Id. at 1189. 
Ct. Madison Gas & Elec. Co., [1979] TAX CT. REp. DEC. (P-H) 72-284 (1979), where 
the taxpayer entered into a joint venture to open a nuclear power plant. As part of the 
cost of participation in the enterprise, the utility incurred costs of training personnel to 
operate the power plant once it came on line. The Tax Court held that the expenses 
"were those of the partnership, not the [utility], and that as pre-operational costs of the 
partnership's initial activity those expenditures must be capitalized." Id. at 72-310. How-
ever, the Commissioner conceded that had the construction of the nuclear plant been 
solely for use in business, such pre-operating expenses would have been currently 
deductible. 
21. With the exception of Colorado Springs, the remaining bank credit card cases 
merely adopted the reasoning of Colorado Springs. First Security Bank v. Commissioner, 
592 F.2d at 1052, aff'g 63 T.C. at 649; First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 558 F.2d at 723-
24; Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. United States, 68 T.C. at 877-78. 
22. 505 F.2d at 1190. 
23.Id. 
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payer was not in business during the years the expenses were 
incurred.24 Therefore, the Colorado Springs court concluded: "A 
new method [of doing business] is distinguishable from a new 
business. "25 
Future Benefits us. Asset Creation 
Having decided that the banks were already engaged in the 
trade or business of credit arrangements, the courts in the credit 
card cases turned to the more far-reaching question of whether 
the banks had acquired something which would benefit future 
economic periods, and if so, whether this circumstance alone re-
quired capitalization of the expenditure. 
In First Security Bank, the Commissioner argued that the 
taxpayers had acquired "several new, separate assets" when they 
made the initial payments on the BankAmericard system.28 Prior 
to First Security Bank, however, the Commissioner had insisted 
that the initial one-time payments should be capitalized under 
section 26327 because it "provides future economic benefits of an 
24. [d. 
25. [d. The court found the facts in Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 
F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973), reu'g 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 171 (1972) more persuasive. In Briarcliff, 
the taxpayer was a New York candy company. In order to recapture sales lost when peo-
ple moved to the suburbs, it set up a "franchise" division to make agency and 
"franchise" agreements with drugstores and other merchants. The taxpayer deducted its 
costs incurred as part of this promotional campaign. The Second Circuit held that tax-
payer's expenditures fit clearly within the long-standing principle allowing an ordinary 
and necessary expense deduction for costs incurred in protecting an existing investment, 
a continuing busine88 or preserving existing income from loss or diminution. [d. at 787 
(citations omitted), 
26. 592 F.2d at 1052. 
27. I.R.C. § 263 (1954) includes "any amount paid out for new buildings or for per-
manent improvements or betterments made to increase the value of any property or es-
tate." Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2 (1958) gives the following examples of capital 
expenditures: 
(a) The cost of acquisition, construction, or erection of build-
ings, machinery and equipment, furniture and fixtures, and 
similar property having a useful life substantially beyond the 
taxable year. 
(b) Amounts expended for securing a copyright and plates, 
which remain the property of the person making the 
payments. 
(c) The cost of defending or perfecting title to property. 
(d) The amount expended for architect's services. 
(e) Commissions paid in purchasing securities. Commissions 
paid in selling securities are an offset against the selling price. 
except that in the case of dealers in securities such commis-
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unknown duration. "28 The courts gave little weight to the Gov-
ernment's theory29 and instead embraced the trend which re-
sions may be treated as an ordinary and necessary business 
expense. 
(0 Amounts assessed and paid under an agreement between 
bondholders or shareholders of a corporation to be used in a 
reorganization of the corporation or voluntary contributions by 
shareholders to the capital of the corporation for any corporate 
purpose. Such amounts are capital investments and are not 
deductible. See section 118 and § 1.118·1. 
(g) A holding company which guarantees dividends at a speci. 
fied rate on the stock of a subsidiary corporation for the pur· 
pose of securing new capital for the subsidiary and increasing 
the value of its stockholdings in the subsidiary shall not de· 
duct amounts paid in carrying out this guaranty in computing 
its taxable income, but such payments are capital expendi. 
tures to be added to the cost of its stock in the subsidiary. 
(h) The cost of good will in connection with the acquisition of 
the assets of a going concern is a capital expenditure. 
28. See First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 413 F. Supp. 1107, 1111 n.5 (D.S.C. 
1976), aff'd, 558 F.2d 721; Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d at 
1191; First Security Bank v. Commissioner, 664 T.C. at 649. In Iowa·Des Moines Nat'l, 
Bank v. United States, 867 T.C. 872, 878 the Government argued that the expenses were 
"nonrecurrent and gave rise to assets or secured benefits having an indefinite useful life." 
(Emphasis added). 
29. The future benefits argument arose out of dicta in Hotel Kingkade v. Commis-
sioner, 180 F.2d 310, 312 (lOth Cir. 1950), where the court stated that an expenditure 
should be capitalized "if it brings about the acquisition of an asset having a useful life in 
excess of one year or if it secures a like advantage to the taxpayer which has a life of 
more than one year." This language was repeated verbatim in United States v. Akin, 248 
F.2d 742, 744 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 956 (1958). However, in Colorado 
Springs, the Tenth Circuit pointed out that the future benefits argument enunciated in 
Hotel Kingkade and Akin had been "to serve as a mere guidepost for the resolution of the 
ultimate issue, not as an absolute role requiring the automatic capitalization of every 
expenditure of providing the taxpayer with a benefit enduring for a period in excess of 
one year." 505 F.2d at 1192, quoting United States v. Wehrli, 400 F.2d 686, 689 (lOth Cir. 
1968). The court further distinguished all cases which involved "acquisitions of, or im-
provements to, a distinct and recognizable property interest. Participation in the Master 
Charge system has no extrinsic or marketable value. It creates no property right." 505 
F.2d at 1192. 
At the Tax Court level, the Government in First Security Bank cited the Tenth Cir-
cuit cases and three other cases to support its future benefits argument. 63 T.C. 644. Two 
cases involved a recognizable intangible asset-Dow Coming Corp. v. Commissioner, 53 
T.C. 54 (l969) (costs for use of a trademark) and Radio Station WBrn, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 31 T.C. 803 (1959) (costs of acquiring a television station license). The third case, 
Glenn L. Heigerick v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 475 (1966), involved a physician's payments 
for medical staff privileges at a hospital. The Tax Court, however, without much discus-
sion, cited Cubbedge Snow v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 585, 593 (1958): 
[Wlhile capital expenditures ordinarily result in the acquisi-
tion of assets having periods of useful life in excess of 1 year, it 
does not follow that an expenditure must be deemed a capital 
outlay merely because the ultimate benefit may accrue in a 
year o~ years subsequent to the year or payment. 
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ceived its impetus, if not its inception, from the Supreme 
Court's asset-creation approach enunciated in Commissioner v. 
Lincoln Savings & Loan Association. 30 
In Lincoln, the Supreme Court summarized the previous de-
cisions dealing with the meaning of ordinary and necessary ex-
penses and stated: "The principal function of the term 'ordinary' 
in section 162(a) is to clarify the distinction, often difficult, be-
tween those expenses that are currently deductible and those in 
the nature of capital expenditures, which, if deductible at all, 
must be amortized over the useful life of the asset."3t The Court 
specifically rejected the Government's argument that the "pres-
ence of an ensuing benefit that may have some future aspect is 
... controlling."32 The Court then enunciated the basic test: 
In Cubbedge Snow, the taxpayer attorneys deducted payments made to a savings and 
loan which they had started with the explicit objective of promoting an additional source 
of legal fees from title searches. 
Finally, in the remaining bank credit card cases, Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. 
United States, 68 T.C. 872, 879, and First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 413 F. Supp. 
1107, 1112 (D. S.C. 1976), aff'd, 558 F.2d 721, the courts again rejected arid disposed of 
the Government's future benefit theory. In Iowa-Des Moines Nat 'I Bank, the Tax Court 
held that the "mere presence of some possible future benefit from an expenditure is not 
controlling where such payment was made to promote the taxpayer's existing business 
and does not create or enhance a separate and distinct asset or property interest." 68 
T.C. at 879. In First Nat'l Bank, the Government cited Georator Corp. v. United States, 
485 F.2d 283, 285 (4th Cir. 1973) where the Georator court commented: "Nor is it neces-
sary that an expenditure increase the value of an asset in order to be classified as a 
capital expenditure .... Costs of defending title to property, although adding nothing to 
the value of the property, have been held to be capital expenditures." The district court 
noted that the Government's reliance on this passage was misconstrued if it was argued 
that there need be no asset at all to which items classified as capital expenditures can be 
tied. 413 F. Supp. at 1112. It went on to say that Georator involved a definite asset-a 
trademark-and was not inconsistent with permitting deduction in full of the bank credit 
card start-up costs "where neither party can identify or define any asset upon which 
taxpayer's assessment expenditures have had any effect." Id. 
30. 403 U.S. 345 (1971). In Lincoln, the taxpayer paid premiums to the Federal Sav-
ings and Loan Insurance Corporation, a corporation created by § 402 of the National 
Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1725 (1969). The payments were made to a general reserve and 
to a secondary reserve, in which each savings and loan had a pro rata share. It was the 
payments to this secondary reserve which the Court held to be non-deductible. 
31. Id. at 353, citing Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689-90 (1966). 
32. 403 U.S. at 354. In the bank credit card cases, the Government cited United 
States v. Mississippi Chemical Corp., 405 U.S. 298 (1972), as authority for its future 
benefits test. In Mississippi Chemical, the taxpayer argued that certain payments made 
to a farm cooperative established by Congress were, in fact, hidden interest charges and, 
therefore, deductible. The Court held that it was a payment for a security interest, stat-
ing that "since the security is of value in more than one taxable year, it is a capital 
asset .... " Id. at 310. The Government's reliance on Mississippi Chemical is misplaced 
since the Mississippi Chemical Court devoted its entire analysis on whether or not the 
payments were for the purchase of an asset. 
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What is important and cl;>ntrolling, we feel, is that 
the . . . payment serves to create or enhance for 
[the taxpayer] what is essentially a separate and 
distinct additional asset and that, as an inevitable 
consequence, the payment is capital in nature and 
not an expense, let alone an ordinary expense, de-
ductible under § 162(a) in the absence of other 
factors not established here.33 
527 
In Briarcliff Candy Company v. Commissioner,34 the Second 
Circuit interpreted the Lincoln holding as "[bringing] about a 
radical shift in emphasis and directing the inquiry ... to the 
question whether or not [the taxpayer] ha[s] created or enhanced 
. . . what was essentially a separate and distinct additional as-
set."'" The Court noted that prior to 1971, the often repeated and 
generally applied standards had been that if an expenditure re-
sulted in agreements or other benefits for a term exceeding one 
year, it was not ordinary but capital in nature.sa However, since 
the courts have consistently rejected the Government's future 
benefits argument,37 the majority view among the federal courts 
is the Second Circuit's interpretation of Lincoln. 38 
33. 403 U.S. at 354. 
34. 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973). See note 25 supra. 
35. Id. at 782. One commentator points out that the earlier approach began with an 
analysis of deductibility of business costs, by first determining whether the cost was "or-
dinary" or "nece88ary" under § 162(a). Modernly, the courts first determine whether the 
expenditure must be capitalized under § 263. See Note, Market Development Costs: Bus-
iness Expense or Capital Investment?, 40 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1447, 1449 (1974). 
The view that Lincoln represents a radical shift in emphasis is disputed. For a thor-
ough discussion of the subject matter, see Gunn, The Requirement That a Capital Ex-
penditure Create or Enhance an Asset, 15 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 443, 444 (1974). 
One commentator views the bank cases as a trend in which the question of deduct-
ibility or non-deductibility is resolved along the lines of generally accepted accounting 
principles. See, Brown and Lee, Deductibility of Start-Up Expenditures Under Section 
162-The "Clear-Reflection-of-Income" Test, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 618, 631-38 (1976). 
36. Id. at 782. 
37. See the bank credit card cases, note 12 supra; see also note 29 supra and accom-
panying text. 
38. This question does not appear to have been litigated in the First, Third, Fifth, 
Sixth or Seventh Circuits. The Court of Claims recently considered whether a company 
could deduct the cost of a survey of its oil and gas reserves, stating: 
The prior decisions on the tax treatment of the cost of produc-
ing surveys said to be comparable to [this] report all seem to 
have gone off on the postulate of considering the survey as part 
of some underlying property. 
In this instance, however, the Government di~avows that ap-
proach and asks us to treat the . . . report by itself, as prop-
erty having a useful life in taxpayer's business lasting beyond 
the taxable year .... 
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Therefore, on appealing First Security Bank to the Ninth 
Circuit, the Commissioner chose not to rely on the "future bene-
fits" approach. Instead, the Government argued that the cost 
was for purchase of several assets, including the right and license 
to use the BankAmericard service marks and distinctive 
emblem, promotional materials and a computer program. 3D The 
Ninth Circuit, however, affirmed the Tax Court findings that: 
(1) the right to use the BankAmericard indicia was not within 
the scope of the initial costs paid, since a bank, already possess-
ing the operation know-how and computer programming, would 
not have been required to pay the initial fees;40 and (2) there was 
nothing to differentiate the promotional materials from other ad-
vertising and office supplies which are deductible}· 
Two judges on the Ninth Circuit panel were "unable to dis-
tinguish between the 'computer costs' involved in the Colorado 
Springs case and the amounts paid for a 'computer program' " by 
the Idaho and Utah banks.42 Judge Duniway disagreed.43 He 
Our difficulty with that line-of-reasoning is that the [engi-
neer's] report, if "property" is not the kind of property which 
should be capitalized by itself, even if its usefulness happens 
to last beyond the year in which it is produced. [The] study 
was scarcely the sort of "separate and distinct asset" that the 
Court in Lincoln Savings & Loan Association . . . found "im-
portant and controlling." 
Southland Royalty Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 604, 616-17 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (citations 
omitted). 
39. 592 F.2d at 1052. This was not the first time that the Commissioner sought to 
identify several assets. In Colorado Springs. the district court ruled in favor of the Com-
missioner that an initial $10,000 membership fee paid to Master Charge was a capital 
expenditure. The fee was a one-time, non-refundable payment that could not be sepa-
rately transferred. The taxpayer did not appeal this ruling. 505 F.2d at 1187-88. Accord. 
Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. United States, 68 T.C. 872 (1977), where the Government 
argued that payments to a telephone solicitation concern responsible for creating a list of 
approved credit customers, similar to a subscription or customers list, were costs which 
must be capitalized. The Tax Court disagreed holding that the cost was merely for credit 
screening which was an expense normally incurred by the bank. 68 T.C. at 880, aff'd on 
this point. 592 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1979). 
40. 592 F.2d at 1052. 
41. 1d. 
42.1d. 
43. 1d. at 1053 (Duniway, J. dissenting). It appears that Judge Duniway was correct. 
In Colorado Springs. the computer costs were for keypunching and inserting its customer 
account data into the computer system, in addition to fees paid for the addition of each 
new merchant and cardholaer to the system, as well as a maintenance fee. 505 F.2d at 
1187. This would appear to differ from a computer program, which is a set of coded 
instructions so that the computer can accept and manipulate the data on a recurring 
basis. However, the Tenth Circuit compared the functions of a computer program with 
the training of clerks, finding that "[c]omputer charges are recurring just as are clerical 
36
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compared computer programs to a punched paper music roll 
used to activate a player piano. He noted that if a restaurant 
owner bought a player piano for his establishment, he would be 
required to amortize the cost of the music rolls over their useful 
life, whereas, if he paid a musician to play for the diners, the 
wages would be ordinary expenses. 44 
C. ANALYSIS 
In First Security Bank, the Ninth Circuit, in ruling that ini-
tial costs for participating in a national bank credit card system 
are deductible as ordinary and necessary expenses, has joined a 
marked trend by courts. This trend permits a taxpayer already 
engaged in a trade or business to deduct expenses of expanding 
markets or new product lines if they are at all related to the 
products of services already provided by the going concern. It is 
clear, too, that the Ninth Circuit, as well as other courts, are 
concerned that if Richmond Television was extended to include 
existing businesses, national economic growth and profits might 
be inhibited. 45 Illustrating this concern, the district court in First 
salaries." [d. at 1191. There is one difference, however. The computer program can be 
sold to someone else; the clerk cannot. 
44. 592 F.2d at 1053. 
45. As the Tenth Circuit in Colorado Springs noted: "The intent to make a future 
profit is obvious. Changes in methods of operation often have a direct bearing on costs 
and profits .... The credit card system takes advantage of modem technology .... To 
paraphrase the Comptroller [of the Currency], the use of these modern facilities furthers 
the objectives of our expanding national economy." 505 F.2d at 1190. 
The Government is not likely to prevail in extending Richmond Television to include 
existing businesses, except in cases where a taxpayer sets up subsidiaries either in corpo-
rate or partnership form. It was recently reported that the 
Appeals Office in a District located in the Fourth Circuit is of 
the opinion that the Richmond Television case applies where 
expansion activities of an ongoing business are conducted by 
the use of separately incorporated subsidiaries. In the matter 
before the Appeals Office, the taxpayer, a consolidated group, 
was engaged in a service-type business, and had multiple oper-
ations, each operation conducted by a separately incorporated 
subsidiary. It is the position of the Appeals Office that had 
taxpayer's activity been conducted by divisions rather than 
subsidiaries, preopening expenses would not be at issue. 
ABA Section on Taxation, Points to Remember, 32 THE TAX LAWYER 790 (1979). 
However, in Baltimore Aircoil Co., Inc. v. United States, 333 F. Supp. 705 (D. Md. 
1971), a parent corporation was permitted to deduct certain expenses in connection with 
opening a plant for a California subsidiary. The taxpayer filed consolidated returns. The 
Commissioner argued that "the trade or business of [the California subsidiary was] not 
the trade or business of Aircoil since they [were] separate and distinct entities, each en-
gaged in separate, though similar, trades or businesses. The Government argued that the 
payments by Aircoil are capital contributions. . . ." [d. at 709. The court, applying the 
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National Bank prefaced its discussion of this issue by noting 
that "[t]he vital role which bank credit cards play in modern 
American Society is unquestionably a property subject for judi-
cial notice. "46 
The courts have also been reluctant to adopt a future bene-
fits test, as promulgated by the Commissioner, especially where 
the taxpayer is not permitted to amortize the costs that are capi-
talized. As the Tenth Circuit stated in Colorado Springs: 
We do not know how the useful life of the asset, 
which the government says was acquired, would 
be determined. The government insists that the 
point is immaterial because we are not concerned 
with amortization .... The government's theo-
retical approach ignores the practicalities of the 
situation, and permits a distortion of taxpayer's 
financial situation. If an expenditure, concededly 
of temporal value, may be neither expensed nor 
amortized, the adoption of technological advances 
is discouraged.·7 
"substance over form" doctrine in favor of the taxpayer found that the California subsid-
iary was a "mere branch or division" of the parent. [d. at 771. 
But see Madison Gas & Elec. Co., [19791 TAX CT. REp. DEC. (P-H) 72-284, where an 
electric utility was denied deduction of the cost of training nuclear plant employees 
where the nuclear power plant was to be conducted through a joint venture with other 
employees. The Government relied on Richmond Television; the taxpayer relied on Balti-
more Aircoil. The court distinguished the utility's position from that in Baltimore Aircoil 
on the ground that the utility did not wholly own the nuclear power plant and that eco-
nomic realities necessitated the need for joint ventures. [d. at 72-309. 
46. 413 F. Supp. at 1110. A footnote, however, points out that "[t]he astronomical 
balances and resulting interest charges which some cardholders inflict upon themselves 
lead the court to question whether the cards are a boon to the consumer as well as to the 
banks. In retrospect, to those of a more conservative philosophy, bankcards are immoral 
for encouraging debt, sometimes reckless debt." [d. at 1110 n.4. 
47. 505 F.2d at 119? This sentiment echoes that of the Second Circuit in Briarcliff 
where the court remarked that "it [was] anybody's guess" as to what intangible assets 
were deductible. 475 F.2d at 782. The court stated: 
The interpretation and application of the statutes and regula-
tions with regard to tangibles in deciding whether a particular 
expenditure is for repairs or for a capital addition or improve-
ment are sometimes difficult, but guidelines have been estab-
lished which give a taxpayer clues as to what is correct and 
what is not. 
In the realm of intangibles, however, the rulings and decisions 
are in a state of hopeless confusion particularly where the issue 
concerns an intangible contribution . . . to an intangible as-
set. . . . Many decisions in this area rest upon administrative 
fiat, fortified by the requirement that the taxpayer show clear 
error .... The taxpayer, who may be exposed to interest and 
38
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The Government's position, extended to its logical conclusion, 
would require the capitalization of nearly all costs of a business, 
because they are incurred to create or enhance a valuable intan-
gible asset-goodwill, which is the sum total of the preservation 
and improvement of existing income. 48 
The courts have also found it difficult to find some distinct 
guidelines to simplify the determination of what expenses are or-
dinary, particularly where no tangible asset or clearly identifi-
able intangible asset is involved. However, the bank cases indi-
cate that courts believe, that because of Lincoln, they have 
found some ground with which they are familiar in rendering 
federal income tax decisions. The Supreme Court's test requiring 
a "distinct and recognizable property interest" has been the 
touchstone. 49 
The courts in the bank cases have mentioned several factors 
which would have to be present in order to find that such a prop-
erty interest exists. Foremost is that the "thing" should be 
saleable, 50 transferrable,5! or have a marketable value.52 Other 
qualities courts mention include an "asset from which [the tax-
payer can] . . . recoup assessments, "53 that has "intrinsic 
value,"54 amounts to "a property right,"55 is something "corpo-
real"58 and non-"recurring."57 Thus, it would appear that if the 
[d. at 785. 
penalties for guessing wrong, is entitled to reasonably clear cri-
teria or standards to let him know what his rights and duties 
are. 
Generally the costs of most intangible assets are not amortized. However, a few ex-
ceptions have been permitted. Organization expenditures of a corporation (IRe § 248) 
and the costs of developing newspaper or magazine circulation (§ 173) may be amortized 
over a period of not less than 60 months. In 1956, Congress amended the Code to permit 
6O-month amortization for trademarks (IRC § 177), and organizational costs of partner-
ships. (IRC § 709). 
48. Goodwill cannot be amortized. Treas. Reg. 1-167(a)(3). 
49. Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. at 355. 
50. First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 558 F.2d at 723, Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank 
v. United States, 505 F.2d at 1192; Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. United States, 68 
T.e. at 878. 
51. First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 558 F.2d at 723. 
52. Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d at 1192. 
53. First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 558 F.2d at 723. 
54. [d. 
55. Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d at 1192. 
56. [d. 
57. [d. See also First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 413 F. Supp. at 1112; Iowa-Des 
Moines Nat'l Bank v. United States, 68 T.e. at 879. The criteria mentioned conform to 
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Service is to prevail in future cases, it will have to be able to 
articulate the asset which has been created or enhanced. Indeed, 
it has already begun to do so, with success.58 
Taxpayers, on the other hand, will need to structure their 
arrangements so that the expenditures are closely related to 
usual and recurring expenses, rather than the acquisition of a 
property right. An example of successful structuring can be seen 
in the BankAmericard contracts entered into by the Idaho and 
Utah banks. The initial one-time fees were apportioned among 
various services and supplies which the banks were to receive. 59 
However, some Master Charge contracts, which did not appor-
tion the costs of the initial payment, were held to be member-
ship fees which must be capitalized.eo 
D. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit, in its brief and conclusionary opinion in 
First Security Bank, has incorporated a number of cases, the 
weight of which will inure to the benefit of those taxpayers who 
are planning to make expenditures to expand their business, 
enter new fields or adopt new methods. In so doing, it is likely 
they will prevail against the Government in deducting those 
costs unless a recognizable intangible asset is involved. 
Helen Rowland Martin 
the opinion of the Second Circuit, which noted that § 263(a) could apply to intangible 
assets "provided they have an ascertainable and measurable value in money's worth, so 
that they are no longer regarded as an expense but as a distinct and recognized property 
interest." Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d at 785 (2d Cir. 1973). 
58. See Madison Gas & Elec. Co., [1979) TAX CT. REp. DEC. (P·H) 72·284; Jack's 
Cookie Co. v. United States, 597 F.2d 395 (1979) (reserve payments in monthly rental 
payments made to a governmental agency, placed in a fund required by bond agree· 
ments, must be capitalized). 
59. First Security Bank v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. at 646, 647 n.9. 
SO. Colorado Springs NaCI Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d at 1187. Iowa·Des 
Moines Nat'l Bank v. United States, 68 T.C. at 880·81. In First NaCI Bank v. United 
States, 558 F.2d 721, the banks were members of a non·profit corporation formed to es· 
tablish a computerized system under Master Charge. There was no stock and no stock· 
holders. The bank members had no interest in the assets, and upon dissolution of the 
corporation, all of its net assets were to be paid to a tax·exempt organization. The 
members' initial fees were specifically for costs of the organization and were computed 
in a manner similar to the monthly recurring charges. [d. at 723. 
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IV. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN TAX 
In Bing Crosby Productions v. United States, 588 F.2d 1293 
(9th Cir. Jan., 1979), the court examined whether motion picture 
and television films and tapes q~alify for an investment tax 
credit. The court held that the master negatives and intermedi-
ate printing articles qualified for investment tax credit. The 
court also held that as long as property is located within the 
United States for 50% of the year, its predominant use is consid-
ered to be within the United States. 
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. General Telephone Co., 
594 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. Jan., 1979), a telephone customer 
brought suit against the telephone company seeking to recover 
excise taxes paid on telephone services. The district court 
granted the telephone company's motion for summary judgment 
and the customer appealed. The court of appeals, adopting a 
Second Circuit holding, held that the Excise Tax Reduction Act 
of 1965 did not impose any duty on the telephone company to 
separate charges for private branch exchange services from 
charges for normal telephone services in its bills to the customer, 
and therefore left the billing practices within the utility's 
discretion. 
In Wood v. United States, 590 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. Jan., 
1979), a taxpayer brought suit to recover income taxes paid on a 
lump sum received upon termination of employment due to disa-
bility. The taxpayer's company plan included both a profit shar-
ing funded retirement plan and disability coverage. The court 
noted that the nature and taxable status of a payment must be 
determined by the event that triggers payment. Since the pay-
ment was made on the basis of disability, the court held that the 
lump sum was excludable from income. 
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